Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Pay for non-instrumental information: an experimental study

经济学博士论文研究：非工具信息付费：一项实验研究

• 批准号: 1656235
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 1.54万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-03-01 至 2019-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1656235&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Pay

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Pay for non-instrumental information: an experimental study (SES: 1656235)Information plays an important role in economic activities. However, by the standard economic view, any information is valuable only if it improves decision-making. This implies no willingness to pay for non-essential information. Experimental data, however, documents the opposite phenomena. This project tests if demand for such non-essential information diminishes in situations where the best choice satisfies a stronger solution concept in game theory. Accounting for the cognitive cost of reasoning may explain why information that may be non-instrumental in theory might nevertheless be important for less than fully rational players. The results of the proposed study will have fundamental implications for economic theory in general and applications such as disclosure of information in implementing mechanisms or policy implementation. The proposed research is aimed at experimental investigation of willingness to pay for non-instrumental information in games with incomplete information where the optimal strategy is either just dominant strategy or obviously dominant strategy, an even stronger solution concept. The project will address fundamental questions about behavior in games with dominant strategy: Is it costly to figure out dominant strategy when it is not obviously enough, and do cognitive costs associated with such obviousness affect the demand of non-instrumental information?The primary approach of the proposed research manipulates the payoff tables of a one-shot normal form game with incomplete information. In all the treatments, the optimal choice is dominant strategy, but might not be obviously dominant strategy. We ask subjects if they are willing to pay a fee to learn the state of nature or the strategy of the opponent. The information will not change the dominant strategy. However, if subjects have difficulty with dominant strategy because of its un-obviousness, they may be willing to pay for such information when the optimal choice is not obviously dominant strategy. Moreover, if subjects have no other reasons for demanding the information, they should not choose to pay the fee when the optimal choice is already obviously dominant strategy. Following the main experiment, all subjects will be asked to participate in a voting game, proposed by Esponda and Vespa (2014) to tests the subjects? abilities of hypothetical thinking. This additional task allows us to investigate whether the choice of paying for non-instrumental information is related to the subjects? ability in hypothetical reasoning, and to verify whether their failure to recognize dominant strategy but not obviously dominant strategy is consistent across different environments.

经济学博士学位论文研究：为非乐器信息付费：实验研究（SES：1656235）信息在经济活动中起着重要作用。但是，从标准的经济角度来看，任何信息只有在改善决策时才有价值。这意味着不愿意为非必需的信息付费。 但是，实验数据记录了相反的现象。该项目测试是否对这种非必需信息的需求会减少最佳选择满足游戏理论中更强大的解决方案概念的情况。考虑到推理的认知成本，可以解释为什么在理论上可能非遗产的信息对于比完全理性的参与者重要。拟议研究的结果将对一般的经济理论和应用程序（例如在实施机制或政策实施中披露信息）具有根本性的影响。拟议的研究旨在进行实验研究，愿意在具有不完整信息的游戏中支付非乐器信息的意愿，在这些信息中，最佳策略要么只是占主导地位的策略，要么是显然主导的策略，这是一个更强大的解决方案概念。该项目将解决有关具有主导策略的游戏中行为的基本问题：当策略不够明显时，找出主要策略的代价高昂，并且与这种明显的认知成本会影响非遗产信息的需求吗？拟议的研究的主要方法操纵了一场正常表格游戏的收益表，并具有不错的信息。在所有治疗方法中，最佳选择是主要的策略，但显然不是主导策略。我们询问受试者是否愿意支付费用来学习自然状况或对手的策略。信息不会改变主导策略。但是，如果受试者因其不可思议而难以占主导地位的策略，那么当最佳选择显然不是主导策略时，他们可能愿意为此信息付费。此外，如果受试者没有其他要求提供信息的原因，那么当最佳选择显然已经是主导策略时，他们不应选择支付费用。在主要实验之后，将要求所有受试者参加Esponda和Vespa（2014）提出的投票游戏，以测试受试者？假设思维的能力。这项额外的任务使我们能够调查选择非乐器信息的选择是否与受试者有关？假设推理的能力，并验证其未能识别主导策略而不是显然主导策略是否在不同环境中保持一致的能力。