Collaborative Research: In Experimental Studies of Auction Markets

合作研究：拍卖市场的实验研究

• 批准号: 9112771
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 2.34万
• 依托单位: University of Houston
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-08-15 至 1993-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9112771&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Experimental; Studies; Auction

There are three parts in this project. The first part deals with learning processes in common value (mineral rights) auctions. Inexperienced bidders in these auctions suffer from the winner's curse, earning negative profits and bidding above the expected value conditional on winning the item. Experience bidders adjust to the adverse selection forces, eventually earning positive profits. The question is exactly what it is that subjects are learning. Are they simply learning to bid less for any given environment, a reaction to losing money as a consequence of winning, or learning to understand the adverse selection forces, which would indicate some ability to generalize across environments. The research has practical implications for understanding bidding behavior in mineral rights auctions and coincides with recent theoretical interest in learning processes in economics as well. The second part studies private value double auctions. Recent developments in theoretical analyses of double auction mechanisms have concentrated on single shot auctions in which traders' valuations are drawn randomly from distributions whose structure is common knowledge, and in which traders have inelastic demands or supplies for a single unit of consumption at a reservation price that is privately known. The motivation for detailed game theoretical studies of particular trading rules is to elaborate precisely how trading rules and each trader's strategic behavior using his private information combine to determine terms of trade that reflect substantially all the disbursed information. In this project, the experimental investigation of these trading rules is designed to determine the behavioral robustness of these predictions. These studies are important since double auctions are a fundamental trading environment for market economies. The last part deals with experimental and field studies of auctions with incentive contracts. Incentive contracts make the payment depend both on the bid and the realized cost. If realized cost exceeds the firm's bid, the firm is responsible for some farction of the cost overrun; if the firm succeeds in keeping its cost below its bid, it is reqarded by being allowed to keep part of the cost underrun. Incentive contracts are of considerable potential practical importance in Department of Defense weapons acquisition and are commonly employed in the construction industry as an alternative to fixed price bid contracts. Further, Nash equilibrium bidding theory makes several clear and novel predictions for incentive contracts that have yet to be subject to systematic study.

这个项目中有三个部分。 第一部分涉及共同价值的学习过程（矿产权利）拍卖。 这些拍卖中没有经验的竞标者遭受了获胜者的诅咒，赚取负利润和竞标以高于预期价值，条件是赢得该项目。 经验竞标者适应不利的选择力，最终获得正利润。 问题到底是在学习主题的是什么。 他们是否只是学会在任何给定的环境中都少竞标，这是对赢得损失的反应，或者学会理解不利的选择力量，这表明某些能力可以跨环境概括。 这项研究对理解矿权拍卖中的招标行为具有实际意义，并且与对经济学学习过程的最新理论兴趣相吻合。 第二部分研究私人价值双重拍卖。 双重拍卖机制的理论分析的最新发展集中在单次拍卖上，在这些拍卖中，交易者的估值是从结构是常识的分布中随机绘制的，其中交易者对以私下面知道的保留价格具有单一消费单位的无弹性要求或供应。 对特定交易规则​​的详细游戏理论研究的详细动机是精确阐述交易规则和每个交易者的战略行为，使用其私人信息结合在一起，以确定反映所有已支付的信息的交易条款。 在这个项目中，对这些交易规则的实验研究旨在确定这些预测的行为鲁棒性。 这些研究很重要，因为双重拍卖是市场经济的基本交易环境。 最后一部分涉及通过激励合同的拍卖的实验和现场研究。 奖励合同使付款既取决于出价和已实现的成本。 如果实现的成本超过公司的出价，则该公司负责成本超支的某些征服；如果公司成功地将其成本保持在其出价以下，则可以通过允许将一部分成本降低来重新定位。 激励合同在国防部的武器采集中具有相当大的潜在实际上重要性，并且通常在建筑行业用作固定价格出价合同的替代方案。 此外，NASH均衡投标理论对尚未受到系统研究的激励合同做出了一些清晰而新颖的预测。