Collaborative Research in Experimental Studies of Auctions and Markets with Asymmetric Information

信息不对称拍卖与市场实验研究中的协作研究

• 批准号: 8921428
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 2.57万
• 依托单位: University of Houston
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-03-01 至 1992-02-29
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8921428&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Experimental; Studies; Auctions

This project extends and completes experimental investigations of English common value auctions, common value auctions with asymmetric (insider) information, and learning processes in experimental auction markets. The project also finishes a case study of the bidding process in the Houston construction industry. Under the previous NSF grant the investigators found conclusive evidence of a "winner's curse" (winning bidders suffer losses) in English auctions. This is an important result methodologically because it contradicts existing theories of bidding and it is important substantively since the English common value auction is a widely used mechanism for auctions. The experiments employed an English clock procedure whereby prices start at the lowest possible value for the item and increase steadily. Bidders are active until they signal their intention to drop out of the auction, which decision is irrevocable for the sale of that item. The last active bidder wins the item, paying the price at which the next to last bidder dropped out. The experiments demonstrated that the dropout prices of losing bidders reveal information to the other bidders and reduce but do not eliminate the winner's curse. Further research should provide new and useful insights into institutions and practices that mitigate or eliminate entirely the winner's curse in auctions. The case study of the construction industry in Houston is especially interesting. In order to determine the generalizability of the auction market findings, the investigators conducted a series of low price, common value offer auctions in comparing the performance of student subjects with experienced professionals from the Houston construction industry. Qualitatively similar behavior was found across subject pools as in both cases bidders suffered from the winner's curse, losing money as a consequence of winning the item, and increasing the number of bidders exacerbated the losses. These results raised an important question: Why are business executives successful in real world auctions and unsuccessful in laboratory auctions? The case study identifies a number of real world institutional features and practices that reduce the effects of the winner's curse.

该项目扩展并完成了对英语共同价值拍卖，不对称（内部）信息的共同价值拍卖以及实验拍卖市场中的学习过程的实验研究。 该项目还完成了休斯顿建筑行业的招标过程的案例研究。 根据先前的NSF赠款，调查人员发现了英语拍卖中的“获胜者的诅咒”（获胜者遭受损失）的确定证据。 从方法上讲，这是一个重要的结果，因为它与现有的招标理论相矛盾，并且基本上很重要，因为英语共同价值拍卖是一种广泛使用的拍卖机制。 该实验采用了英语时钟程序，其价格以该项目的最低价值开头并稳定增长。 投标人会活跃，直到他们表示打算退出拍卖的意图为止，该决定是不可撤销的。 最后一个活跃的竞标者赢得了该项目，付出了下一个出价者退出的价格。 实验表明，失去竞标者的辍学价格向其他竞标者揭示了信息，并减少但不会消除获胜者的诅咒。 进一步的研究应为机构和实践提供新的有用的见解，以减轻或消除拍卖中获胜者的诅咒。 休斯顿建筑业的案例研究特别有趣。 为了确定拍卖市场调查结果的普遍性，调查人员进行了一系列低价，共同价值在比较学生受试者与休斯顿建筑业的经验丰富的专业人员的表现时提供了拍卖。 在质量池中发现了相似的行为，就像在这两种情况下一样，竞标者都遭受了获胜者的诅咒，由于赢得该项目而损失了钱，并增加了投标人的数量，这加剧了损失。 这些结果提出了一个重要的问题：为什么业务高管在现实世界拍卖中取得成功而在实验室拍卖中的成功？ 案例研究确定了许多现实世界的机构特征和实践，以减少获胜者诅咒的影响。