Collaborative Research: Multi-Unit Demand Auctions

合作研究：多单位需求拍卖

• 批准号: 9631845
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-08-01 至 2000-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9631845&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Multi; Unit; Demand

Recent theoretical developments in multi-unit demand (one sided) auctions make it clear that uniform price auctions create an incentive for demand reductions (bid shaving) resulting in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, extensions of the Vickrey auction rule to multi-unit demand auctions promise, in theory, to restore economic efficiency and to raise expected revenue relative to uniform price auctions under a wide variety of circumstances. These predictions rest critically on bidders recognizing and responding appropriately to the strategic opportunities for demand reductions in uniform price auctions and following a "sincere" bidding strategy in the Vickrey auctions. The purpose of this research is to explore behavior in multi-unit demand auctions through both theory and experiments. The experiments will focus on the extent to which bidders reduce demand, and the resulting inefficiencies and revenue impact, in uniform price auctions when bidders have equal and unequal demands and with more or less intense competition. Vickrey auction experiments will focus on the effects of different implementation rules for inducing sincere bidding using a relatively transparent, open English clock auction procedure and a sealed bid version of the clock procedure that may prove more tractable in field settings. Behavior will be studied in both interactive and non-interactive (games against computerized bidders) environments with the latter designed to eliminate the "noise" associated with other players' actions on learning to behave strategically. Theoretical work will provide benchmark models against which to evaluate the experimental outcomes and to identify conditions where there are tradeoffs in theory, between efficiency and revenue under the different auction institutions. Work in multi-unit demand auctions is important because (i) most auctions involve multi-unit demands and (ii) a number of insights obtained from unit demand auctions fail to hold with multi-un it demands. Many of these issues have come to the forefront-with the design and implementation of the recent spectrum auctions.

多单位需求（单面）拍卖的最新理论发展清楚地表明，统一的价格拍卖会激励减少需求（剃须），从而导致效率低下的结果。 相比之下，从理论上讲，维克里拍卖规则的扩展是多单位拍卖的承诺，可以恢复经济效率并提高预期收入，相对于各种情况下的统一价格拍卖。 这些预测至关重要的是，竞标者认识并适当地响应了统一价格拍卖的需求减少的战略机会，并遵循Vickrey拍卖中的“真诚”竞标战略。 这项研究的目的是通过理论和实验探索多单元的行为要求拍卖。 这些实验将集中在投标人减少需求的程度，以及当竞标者具有平等和不平等的需求以及或多或少激烈的竞争时，以统一的价格拍卖的效率低下和收入影响。 Vickrey拍卖实验将着重于使用相对透明，开放的英语时钟拍卖过程和时钟过程的密封出价版本的不同实施规则的效果，以诱发真诚的招标，这些版本可能在现场设置中更可拖延。 在交互式和非相互作用（针对计算机投标的游戏）环境中，将研究行为，后者旨在消除与其他玩家对学习战略行为的行为相关的“噪音”。 理论工作将提供基准模型，以评估实验结果，并确定理论上在不同拍卖机构下效率和收入之间进行权衡的条件。 多单位需求拍卖中的工作很重要，因为（i）大多数拍卖涉及多单位需求以及（ii）从单位需求拍卖获得的许多见解无法满足其需求。这些问题中的许多问题都走到了最前沿，并在最近的Spectrum拍卖中设计和实施。