Doctoral Dissertation Research: Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental Study

博士论文研究：战略复杂性与合作：实验研究

• 批准号: 1121085
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 0.72万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1121085&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Strategic; Complexity

This award funds research that uses decision-making experiments to investigate the importance of strategic complexity in repeated games. The project will test hypotheses about the possible cognitive costs of strategic complexity and how these costs affect decisions to cooperate in a repeated game in which the efficient outcome requires cooperation but each individual involved may benefit from selfish behavior.Previous literature in game theory indicates that cooperation in repeated games may be limited by the complexity of the strategic environment, as cooperative strategies are generally associated with greater cognitive costs and less certain outcomes than selfish strategies. The experiments funded by this award observe the cooperation rate in a standard indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and compare it with cooperation in a similar but more complex strategic environment. The design allows an investigation of whether the impact on cooperation depends on the source of complexity in the strategic environment.Broader impacts include contributing to graduate education and the possible interdisciplinary impact of the research, which crosses boundaries between game theory, decision science, and behavioral economics.

该奖项为使用决策实验来研究战略复杂性在重复游戏中的重要性。 该项目将测试有关战略复杂性可能的认知成本以及这些成本如何影响在重复游戏中进行合作的决策的假设，在这种游戏中，有效的结果需要合作，但每个涉及的人可能会受益于自私行为。游戏理论中的自私文献表明，与合作的策略相比，重复游戏中的合作可能受到重复的合作的限制，而与更大的策略相关，而与更大的策略相关，并且与更大的战略相关。 该奖项资助的实验观察到了标准重复重复囚犯的困境中的合作率，并将其与在类似但更复杂的战略环境中的合作进行了比较。 该设计允许调查对合作的影响是否取决于战略环境中复杂性的来源。公民影响包括为研究生教育做出贡献以及研究对研究的可能跨学科影响，该研究跨越了游戏理论，决策科学和行为经济学之间的界限。