Doctoral Dissertation Research: Do Irrelevant Payoffs Affect Behavior When a Dominant Strategy is Available: Experimental Evidence from Second-Price Auctions

博士论文研究：当存在主导策略时，不相关的收益是否会影响行为：来自二价拍卖的实验证据

• 批准号: 0921780
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 0.75万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-07-01 至 2011-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0921780&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Do; Irrelevant

In a second-price auction (SPA) with private values, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins the auction and pays the second highest bid. In a SPA, bidders simultaneously submit one bid each. According to theory, the bidder's best strategy is to bid exactly what the item is worth to her. In game theory parlance this optimal bid is known as a "dominant strategy," that is, it is optimal for each bidder regardless of what others are bidding. Dominant strategies have robust properties but are extremely rare in auction environments. Past evidence from laboratory experiments has shown that bidders almost always bid above the amount corresponding to the dominant strategy in an SPA, i.e. they behave irrationally according to the theory. This project examines the conjecture that, while bidding behavior is not rational, it does respond in a sensible and predictable way to incentives. A laboratory experiment will test whether bids above the dominant strategy increase when such overbidding is less costly, and decrease when it is more costly, even though the experiment is constructed so that these incentives do not affect the value of the dominant strategy bid itself.Should the conjecture prove correct, the results will inform designers of selling mechanisms. Although game theory makes very clear predictions, bidders do not often behave exactly as predicted. Results from investigations that examine systematic deviations from the theory can be incorporated by auction designers who wish to maximize revenue or efficiency. Given that such auctions have been used by both government and the private sector to sell a variety of securities and physical assets, the practical applications of such research are widespread.

在具有私人价值观的第二价格拍卖（SPA）中，提交最高出价的投标人赢得了拍卖，并支付了第二高价。 在水疗中心，竞标者同时提交一份投标。 根据理论，投标人的最佳策略是准确竞标该物品对她的价值。在游戏理论中，这种最佳出价被称为“主要策略”，也就是说，无论其他人竞标什么，它对于每个出价者都是最佳的。主导策略具有强大的特性，但在拍卖环境中极为罕见。 实验室实验的过去证据表明，竞标者几乎总是竞标与水疗中主导策略相对应的数量，即根据理论非理性的行为。 该项目研究了以下猜想：尽管投标行为不是理性的，但它确实以明智而可预测的方式对激励措施做出反应。一个实验室实验将测试超过主导策略的出价是否在昂贵的成本较低时是否增加，即使构建实验的成本更高，也会减少，以便这些激励措施不会影响主导策略本身的价值。猜想本来可以证明是正确的，但结果将为销售机制的设计师提供信息。 尽管游戏理论做出了非常清楚的预测，但投标人的行为并不完全像预期的那样。 希望最大化收入或效率的拍卖设计师可以纳入研究与该理论系统偏差的研究结果。 鉴于政府和私营部门都使用此类拍卖来出售各种证券和物理资产，因此这种研究的实际应用是广泛的。