Vulnerability & The Other Non-Human Animal: a Phenomenological Approach to Animal Ethics

漏洞

• 批准号: 2906707
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Sheffield
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2024
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2024 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2906707
• 关键词: Vulnerability; Other; Non; Human; Animal

This project uses the phenomenological approach offered by Levinas(1981) and Logstrup(2020) to address the question of animal ethics. Most current accounts of animal ethics in the Western tradition ground morality on a being's capabilities. This approach is the capabilities approach and is defended by a wide range of philosophers (Nussbaum (2006), Palmer (2010), Bendik-Keymer (2014), Korsgaard (2018), Irvin (2004)). While all theorists agree that moral considerability is tied to an animal's possession of certain capabilities, they all disagree on the set of capabilities. This conceptual disagreement hints at a wider problem generated by the capabilities approach, i.e., its incapacity to account for the moral worth of less cognitively developed beings such as mentally disabled humans and non-human animals.This thesis aims to relocate ethics at the level of the encounter with an Other. I shall argue that a phenomenological approach to animal ethics is best suited to solve the problems generated by capabilities models because it views ethics as arising out of a being's vulnerability. Phenomenology is the study of the first-person experience of beings in the world. I will use the phenomenological approaches of Levinas and Logstrup to explore the ethical dimension arising during a being's interaction with another being. I will argue that the embodied presence of a non-human animal facing a human being creates a demand on the latter. What Logstrup calls the 'Ethical Demand' is the one-sided and silent request the Other makes on the One by exposing their vulnerability to them. This demand is prior to any convention and can only be heard by the One who becomes morally responsible for the Other. Ethics is not the product of capabilities, but is rather the pre-conceptual weight of being confronted to another living creature which has infinite needs that need to be fulfilled.

该项目使用 Levinas（1981）和 Logstrup（2020）提供的现象学方法来解决动物伦理问题。西方传统中大多数当前对动物伦理的描述都将道德建立在生物的能力之上。这种方法是能力方法，并受到众多哲学家的支持（Nussbaum (2006)、Palmer (2010)、Bendik-Keymer (2014)、Korsgaard (2018)、Irvin (2004)）。尽管所有理论家都同意道德重要性与动物拥有的某些能力有关，但他们对能力的集合都存在分歧。这种概念上的分歧暗示了能力方法产生的一个更广泛的问题，即它无法解释认知能力较差的生物（例如精神残疾的人类和非人类动物）的道德价值。与他人的相遇。我认为动物伦理学的现象学方法最适合解决能力模型产生的问题，因为它认为伦理学是由存在的脆弱性产生的。现象学是对世界上存在的第一人称体验的研究。我将使用列维纳斯和洛格斯特鲁普的现象学方法来探索一个存在与另一个存在互动过程中产生的伦理维度。我认为，面对人类的非人类动物的具体存在对人类产生了需求。洛斯特鲁普所说的“道德要求”是他人通过向他人暴露自己的脆弱性而向他人提出的单方面、无声的要求。这一要求先于任何大会，并且只能由对他者负有道德责任的一方听到。道德不是能力的产物，而是面对另一个有无限需求需要满足的生物时的前概念重量。