Conceptualizing Individual Moral Obligation: A Case for Collectively Insignificant Outcomes

个人道德义务的概念化：集体结果微不足道的案例

• 批准号: 2886157
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Manchester
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2886157
• 关键词: Conceptualizing; Individual; Moral; Obligation; Case

In this thesis, I argue, contra Julia Nefsky, that the 'problem of collective harm' goes beyond a mistaken assumption to reveal a poor conceptualization of individual obligation to act in morally relevant ways, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively. However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.

我认为，在这篇论文中，反对朱莉娅·尼夫斯基（Contra Julia Nefsky），“集体危害的问题”超出了错误的假设，即揭示了个人义务以道德上相关的方式行事的概念不佳，而不论集体微不足道的结果。我的目标是建立其他事物，为什么要在集体行动的重要原则中最好地由个人道德义务（以下简称“ IMO”）来激发，这是对共同利益所必需的“非填充基本义务”的概念。集体危害案件有各种各样的说法（Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017，2019，2012a，2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011）以及集体和个人责任/责任案件（Hold 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2021; Collins 2017，2020）。 Nefsky（2017：2744）阐明了一个无意识的行动的有见地的案例，是“集体伤害的问题”和集体行动的案件，例如“集体影响案件”。根据Nefsky（2019：1）（2019：1）（2019：1），“集体危害”，“集体伤害”在某种程度上没有造成某种危害的情况下，并且在某种情况下，在某种情况下，在某种情况下又不出现某种差异，并且在某种程度上造成了各种差异，并且在某种程度上造成了与众不同的行动，并且在某种程度上既不是在又有一个相关的行动，而是在某种程度上行动'''''''''''''''''''''案件捕获“我们共同避免造成的危害的风险”（Nefsky 2019：10），通过道德上有害的行动或拒绝以道德上相关的方式行事，因为我们的奇异行为共同使我们的道德责任无关。 Sinnott-Armstrong 2005）。对于Nefsky（2019：10）而言，我们的奇异行动“ [B]太小而无法自身改变结果并不意味着无法实现不变的朝着不同的结果进行。”因此，尼夫斯基（Nefsky）处于肯定奇异行为在实现结果方面的相关性，即使它没有共同改变。但是，这种思考集体伤害案件的思考方式有什么问题？无论总体上微不足道的结果如何，是否有理由以道德上相关的方式行事？如果是，无论如何表演的最佳理由是什么？有意识地行事的方式有什么损害道德上有害的结果，有什么问题吗？另外，如果我们竭尽所能为集体危害做出贡献，那么是什么使我们的角色在道德上无关紧要的集体解决方案做出贡献呢？最重要的是这项研究，IMO在集体影响案件中的位置是什么？ IMO可以提供更好的动力或基础，以实现无关紧要的结果吗？这项研究将试图参与这些相关问题的可辩护答案。