International Institutions and Policy Cooperation between Democratic and Non-Democratic States

国际机构和民主与非民主国家之间的政策合作

• 批准号: 15530101
• 负责人: SUZUKI Motoshi
• 金额: $ 1.98万
• 依托单位: Kyoto University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2003 至 2004
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530101/
• 关键词: international institution; international cooperation; democratic peace; democracy; game theory; international governance; compliance; international human rights law; 国際平和; 安全保障; バーゲニング; 国際関係理論; 不確実性

A cause of conflict escalation rests on the failure to communicate between states with opposing interests. However, it is difficult to build a truthful communication channel between egoistic sovereign states because they have incentives to cheat on their intents and power under the anarchic international system. The contemporary theory of democratic peace argues that democratic states with transparent decision-making processes can avoid escalation of the conflict that each does not deserve.This study, based on the democratic peace theory, has explored international institutions that can lessen informational problems that plague the relationship between democratic and non-democratic states. It assumes that non-democratic states have nontransparent decision processes and thus generate problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and verification in relations with democratic states. Focusing on nonproliferation and human rights regimes, the study evaluates the effectiveness of a limited trigger mechanism on the former and the clause conditioning free trade provision upon democratic governance on the latter. This line of research contributes to designing an effective international governance system with heterogeneous states.

冲突升级的一个原因在于利益对立国家之间未能沟通。然而，在无政府主义的国际体系下，利己主义的主权国家之间很难建立起真实的沟通渠道，因为它们有欺骗自己的意图和权力的动机。当代民主和平理论认为，具有透明决策过程的民主国家可以避免每个人不应承受的冲突升级。这项研究以民主和平理论为基础，探索了可以减少困扰世界的信息问题的国际机构。民主国家与非民主国家之间的关系。它假设非民主国家的决策过程不透明，从而在与民主国家的关系中产生道德风险、逆向选择和核查等问题。该研究以防扩散和人权制度为重点，评估了前者有限触发机制的有效性，以及后者以民主治理为条件的自由贸易条款的有效性。这一研究方向有助于设计一个有效的异质国家国际治理体系。

项目成果

International Security and Peace (anzen hosho to heiwa)

国际安全与和平（anzen hosho to heiwa）

• 发表时间: 2006
• 作者: Motoshi Suzuki;鈴木基史;Motoshi Suzuki;鈴木 基史;Motoshi Suzuki
• 通讯作者: Motoshi Suzuki

Determinants of Multiparty Competition Under Japan's Parallel Electoral System

日本并行选举制度下多党竞争的决定因素

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Kyoto Journal of Law and Political Science 2
• 作者: Motoshi Suzuki

国際協定遵守問題のゲーム理論的分析

国际协议合规问题的博弈论分析

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: ゲーム理論の応用(今井晴雄・岡田章編著)(勁草書房)
• 作者: Motoshi Suzuki;鈴木基史
• 通讯作者: 鈴木基史

鈴木基史: "平和と安全保障"東京大学出版会. 225 (2005)

铃木元文：《和平与安全》东京大学出版社225（2005）。

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Problems of Compliance with International Agreements (Kokusai Kyotei no Junshumondai no Game Rironteki Bunseki)

遵守国际协议问题的博弈论分析（Kokusai Kyotei no Junshumondai no Game Rironteki Bunseki）

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Applications of Game Theory (Game Riron no Oyo)(Haruo Imai and Akira Okada, eds.)(Keiso Shobo)
• 作者: Motoshi Suzuki;鈴木基史;Motoshi Suzuki
• 通讯作者: Motoshi Suzuki