CPS: Medium: Cyber Attack-Defense Modeling, Risk and Contingency Analysis for the Power Grid using Game Theory

CPS：中：利用博弈论对电网进行网络攻防建模、风险和应急分析

• 批准号: 1739969
• 负责人: Manimaran Govindarasu
• 金额: $ 77.73万
• 依托单位: Iowa State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-09-15 至 2022-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1739969&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CPS; Medium; Cyber; Attack; Defense

Modern electric power grid is a complex, interconnected cyber physical system (CPS) that forms the lifeline of our society. Reliable, secure, and efficient operation of the grid are of paramount importance to national security and economic well-being. Recent trends in security indicate the increasing threat of cyber-based attacks, both in numbers and sophistication, on energy and other critical infrastructure systems of our nation and the world in general. To address this growing threat, there is a compelling research need to develop a holistic cyber security framework that encompasses attack deterrence, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation and resilience, and attack attribution and forensics. Risk assessment is one of the fundamental building blocks that cut across attack prevention, mitigation, and resilience. The existing tools for risk assessment and mitigation are mostly qualitative and often subjective, and hence they are grossly inadequate to capture the dynamic and uncertain nature of the adversaries and the complex cyber-physical couplings that exist in the grid. This project will develop a scientific methodology, algorithms, and tools for cyber risk assessment, attack-defense modeling, and cyber contingency analysis by leveraging game theoretic tools and solution strategies. The developed security algorithms and tools will be evaluated in a realistic CPS security testbed environment at Iowa State University and the results will be broadly shared with research community and also with industry for potential adoption. The innovative applications of game theoretic formulations and tools will help to develop secure and resilient algorithms that will prevent and mitigate attacks and will make the future grid resilient to both faults and cyber-attacks. The research also will have broader impacts in improving the security and resiliency of other CPS-based critical infrastructure systems, such as oil and natural gas networks and transportation networks. Through the associated educational and outreach activities, via graduate courses, undergraduate capstone projects, and K-12 outreach program, the project will contribute to a highly skilled workforce in this area of national need. The project will help diversity in cybersecurity workforce by engaging women and underrepresented minorities in research and educational activities. In addition, the project will significantly contribute to imparting hands-on cybersecurity training to industry professionals using the testbed platform. Both educational and training modules will be made available to a broader academic and industry communities.The overarching vision of this project is to transform the fault-resilient grid of today into an attack-resilient grid of the future. Towards achieving this vision, the goal of the project is to develop and evaluate algorithms and tools that will significantly advance the state-of-the-art cyber risk assessment, attack-defense modeling, and cyber contingency analysis. This goal will be accomplished by undertaking the following research tasks: (1) Develop fundamental game-theoretic formulations (single stage, multi-stage, Bayesian) for attack-defense modeling for the power grid using behavioral and learning models; (2) Develop a quantitative cyber risk assessment and mitigation methodology that capture all three components of risk -- namely, threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences -- using pragmatic game-theoretic formulations, and optimize the security investments to defend the grid against high-risk attacks; (3) Develop scalable techniques and tools for real-time operational planning using game-theoretic formulations to account for multiple contingencies arising due to coordinated cyber-attacks, and integrate them into a dynamic contingency analysis methodology as part of the Energy Management System (EMS); (4) Evaluate the effectiveness and scalability of the developed solutions and tools on Iowa State CPS security testbed environment using realistic attack-defense scenarios leveraging well documented power and cyber system topologies and synthetic attack traces and also leveraging Iowa State industry partnerships in Electric Power Research Center (EPRC) and Power System Research Center (PSERC).

现代电力电网是构成我们社会生命线的复杂，相互联系的网络物理系统（CPS）。网格的可靠，安全和有效的操作对于国家安全和经济福祉至关重要。安全性的最新趋势表明，基于网络的攻击在数量和复杂性，对我们国家和全世界的能源和其他关键基础设施系统上的威胁日益增加。为了应对这种日益严重的威胁，有一项令人信服的研究需要开发一个整体网络安全框架，该框架涵盖了攻击威慑，预防攻击，攻击检测，攻击缓解和弹性以及攻击归因和取证。风险评估是削减预防，缓解和弹性的基本构件之一。现有的风险评估和缓解工具主要是定性的，而且通常是主观的，因此它们严重不足以捕捉对手的动态和不确定性质以及网格中存在的复杂的网络物理耦合。该项目将通过利用游戏理论工具和解决方案策略来开发一种科学方法论，算法和网络风险评估，攻击防御建模以及网络偶然分析的工具。已开发的安全算法和工具将在爱荷华州立大学的现实CPS安全测试床环境中进行评估，结果将与研究社区以及行业广泛共享，以实现潜在的采用。游戏理论配方和工具的创新应用将有助于开发安全且有弹性的算法，从而预防和减轻攻击，并将使未来的网格能够抵御故障和网络攻击。这项研究还将在改善基于CPS的其他关键基础设施系统（例如石油和天然气网络和运输网络）的安全性和弹性方面产生更大的影响。通过相关的教育和外展活动，通过研究生课程，本科盖石项目和K-12外展计划，该项目将在这一国家需要的领域中有助于高技能的劳动力。该项目将通过使妇女和代表性不足的少数群体从事研究和教育活动来帮助网络安全劳动力的多样性。此外，该项目将极大地有助于使用TestBed平台向行业专业人员提供动手的网络安全培训。教育和培训模块都将提供给更广泛的学术和行业社区。该项目的总体愿景是将当今的故障弹性网格转变为未来攻击的网格。为了实现这一愿景，该项目的目的是开发和评估算法和工具，这些算法和工具将大大推动最新的网络风险评估，攻击防御建模和网络应变分析。该目标将通过执行以下研究任务来实现：（1）使用行为和学习模型开发基本的游戏理论表述（单阶段，多阶段，贝叶斯），用于使用行为和学习模型为电网进行攻击防御建模； （2）使用务实的游戏理论配方，开发一种定量的网络风险评估和缓解方法，即捕获所有三个风险（即威胁，脆弱性和后果）的三个组成部分，即威胁，脆弱性和后果，并优化了安全投资以捍卫网格侵害高风险攻击； （3）使用游戏理论公式开发可扩展的技术和工具，用于实时操作计划，以说明由于协调的网络攻击而引起的多个意外事件，并将它们集成到能源管理系统（EMS）的一部分中的动态意外分析方法中； （4）使用现实的攻击防御式场景，评估已开发的解决方案和工具在爱荷华州CPS安全性测试台环境上的有效性和可扩展性，利用了有记录良好的电力和网络系统拓扑以及合成攻击痕迹，并利用爱荷华州国家行业在电力研究中心（EPRC）和Power System Research Center（PSERC）（PSERC）（PSERC）。

项目成果

A Novel Methodology for Cybersecurity Investment Optimization in Smart Grids using Attack-Defense Trees and Game Theory

使用攻击防御树和博弈论优化智能电网网络安全投资的新方法

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: IEEE Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT
• 作者: Hyder, Burhan;Govindarasu, Manimaran
• 通讯作者: Govindarasu, Manimaran

Security Resource Investment Optimization for Critical Infrastructure Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach

关键基础设施系统的安全资源投资优化：博弈论方法

• DOI: 10.23919/acc53348.2022.9867416
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: American Control Conference (ACC
• 作者: Clanin, Joe;Bhattacharya, Sourabh
• 通讯作者: Bhattacharya, Sourabh

An Efficient Computational Strategy for Cyber-Physical Contingency Analysis in Smart Grids

智能电网中网络物理应急分析的高效计算策略

• DOI: 10.1109/pesgm46819.2021.9637857
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: IEEE PES General Meeting
• 作者: Emadi, Hamid;Clanin, Joe;Hyder, Burhan;Khanna, Kush;Govindarasu, Manimaran;Bhattacharya, Sourabh
• 通讯作者: Bhattacharya, Sourabh

CySec Game: A Framework and Tool for Cyber Risk Assessment and Security Investment Optimization in Critical Infrastructures

CySec Game：关键基础设施网络风险评估和安全投资优化的框架和工具

• DOI: 10.1109/rws55399.2022.9984040
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Resilience Week Symposium (RWS
• 作者: Hyder, Burhan;Majerus, Harrison;Sellars, Hayden;Greazel, Jonathan;Strobel, Joseph;Battani, Nicholas;Peng, Stefan;Govindarasu, Manimaran
• 通讯作者: Govindarasu, Manimaran

On the Characterization of Saddle Point Equilibrium for Security Games with Additive Utility

具有可加性效用的安全博弈鞍点均衡表征

• DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_19
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: GameSec Conference
• 作者: Emadi, Hamid;Bhattacharya, Sourabh
• 通讯作者: Bhattacharya, Sourabh