Collaborative Research: CPS: Medium: Sensor Attack Detection and Recovery in Cyber-Physical Systems

合作研究：CPS：中：网络物理系统中的传感器攻击检测和恢复

• 批准号: 2333980
• 负责人: Fanxin Kong
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: University of Notre Dame
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2023-10-01 至 2025-06-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2333980&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CPS; Medium; Sensor

New vulnerabilities arise in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) as new technologies are integrated to interact and control physical systems. In addition to software and network attacks, sensor attacks are a crucial security risk in CPS, where an attacker alters sensing information to negatively interfere with the physical system. Acting on malicious sensor information can cause serious consequences. While many research efforts have been devoted to protecting CPS from sensor attacks, several critical problems remain unresolved. First, existing attack detection works tend to minimize the detection delay and false alarms at the same time; this goal, however, is not always achievable due to the inherent trade-off between the two metrics. Second, there has been much work on attack detection, yet a key question remains concerning what to do after detecting an attack. Importantly, a CPS should detect an attack and recover from the attack before irreparable consequences occur. Third, the interrelation between detection and recovery has met with insufficient attention: Integrating detection and recovery techniques would result in more effective defenses against sensor attacks.This project aims to address these key problems and develop novel detection and recovery techniques. The project aims to achieve timely and safe defense against sensor attacks by addressing real-time adaptive-attack detection and recovery in CPS. First, this project explores new attack detection techniques that can dynamically balance the trade-off between the detection delay and the false-alarm rate in a data-driven fashion. In this way, the detector will deliver attack detection with predictable delay and maintain the usability of the detection approach. Second, this project pursues new recovery techniques that bring the system back to a safe state before a recovery deadline while minimizing the degradation to the mission being executed by the system. Third, this project investigates efficient techniques that address the attack detection and recovery in a coordinated fashion to significantly improve response to attacks. Specific research tasks include the development of real-time adaptive sensor attack detection techniques, real-time attack recovery techniques, and attack detection and recovery coordination techniques. The developed techniques will be implemented and evaluated on multiple CPS simulators and an autonomous vehicle testbed.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

由于新技术已集成以进行交互和控制物理系统，因此在网络物理系统（CPS）中出现了新的漏洞。除了软件和网络攻击外，传感器攻击是CPS中的至关重要的安全风险，在这种情况下，攻击者会改变感应信息，从而负面干扰物理系统。对恶意传感器信息作用可能会导致严重后果。尽管许多研究工作已致力于保护CPS免受传感器攻击的侵害，但仍未解决几个关键问题。首先，现有的攻击检测工作往往会同时最大程度地减少检测延迟和错误警报。但是，由于两个指标之间的固有权衡，这个目标并不总是可以实现的。其次，在攻击检测方面有很多工作，但是在检测攻击后该怎么做的关键问题仍然存在。重要的是，在发生无法弥补的后果之前，CPS应检测攻击并从攻击中恢复。 第三，检测与恢复之间的相互关系不足以引起注意：整合检测和恢复技术将导致对传感器攻击的更有效的防御能力。该项目旨在解决这些关键问题并开发新颖的检测和恢复技术。该项目旨在通过解决CP中的实时自适应攻击和恢复来及时，安全地防止传感器攻击。首先，该项目探讨了新的攻击检测技术，这些技术可以以数据驱动的方式动态平衡检测延迟与虚假警报率之间的权衡。 通过这种方式，检测器将以可预测的延迟进行攻击检测，并保持检测方法的可用性。其次，该项目采用了新的恢复技术，该技术在恢复截止日期之前将系统恢复到安全状态，同时最大程度地减少了系统执行的任务的退化。第三，该项目研究了以协调的方式解决攻击检测和恢复的有效技术，以显着改善对攻击的反应。具体的研究任务包括开发实时自适应传感器攻击检测技术，实时攻击恢复技术以及攻击检测和恢复协调技术。该技术将在多个CPS模拟器和自动驾驶汽车测试中进行实施和评估。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛影响的评估标准来评估值得支持的。

项目成果

Path Planning for UAVs Under GPS Permanent Faults

• DOI: 10.1145/3653074
• 发表时间: 2024-03
• 期刊: ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
• 影响因子: 2.3
• 作者: M. Sulieman;Mengyu Liu;M. C. Gursoy;Fanxin Kong

Work in Progress: Emerging From Shadows: Optimal Hidden Actuator Attack to Cyber-Physical Systems

正在进行的工作：走出阴影：对网络物理系统的最佳隐藏执行器攻击

• 发表时间: 2024
• 期刊: IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium
• 作者: Miji, Md Kausar;Liu, Mengyu;Akowuah, Francis;Kong, Fanxin
• 通讯作者: Kong, Fanxin

Fast Attack Recovery for Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems

随机网络物理系统的快速攻击恢复

• 发表时间: 2024
• 期刊: IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium
• 作者: Zhang, Lin;Burbano, Luis;Chen, Xin;Cardenas, Alvaro A;Drager, Steven;Adderson, Matthew;Kong, Fanxin
• 通讯作者: Kong, Fanxin

Catch You if Pay Attention: Temporal Sensor Attack Diagnosis Using Attention Mechanisms for Cyber-Physical Systems

• DOI: 10.1109/rtss59052.2023.00016
• 发表时间: 2023-12
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS)
• 作者: Zifan Wang;Lin Zhang;Qinru Qiu;Fanxin Kong

Poster Abstract: Assuring LLM-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems

海报摘要：确保支持法学硕士的网络物理系统

• 发表时间: 2024
• 期刊: ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
• 作者: Xu, Weizhe;Liu, Mengyu;Drager, Steven;Adderson, Matthew;Kong, Fanxin
• 通讯作者: Kong, Fanxin