CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Detection and Isolation of Malicious Inclusions in Secure Hardware (DIMINISH)

CT-ISG：协作研究：安全硬件中恶意包含的检测和隔离 (DIMINIISH)

• 批准号: 0716559
• 负责人: James Plusquellic
• 金额: $ 15万
• 依托单位: University of Maryland Baltimore County
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-08-01 至 2009-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0716559&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CT; ISG; Collaborative; Research; Detection

Due to global economy pressures, fabrication of advanced integrated circuits (ICs) is migrating to foreign foundries. It has become a common trend for many fab-less companies and government agencies to ship their designs offshore for low-cost fabrication. These trends have raised serious concerns regarding possible threats or attacks on US military systems, critical sites and even household appliances that rely on high performance chips. There are various potential vulnerabilities to such systems caused by malicious alterations of hardware processes that might make these vital systems inoperable at some future time. Such malicious manipulation of ICs slated for installation in US weapon systems cannot be tolerated.The focus of this research is on the development of automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) and signal analysis techniques for detecting and locating malicious alterations, e.g. the insertion of Trojan circuits, during wafer probe aor package test as a means of improving the level of trustworthiness of the chip. In particular, techniques that significantly improve the resolution of quiescent current and transient current techniques for detecting and locating Trojan circuits are investigated. A second focus of the project is on the development of ATPG methods designed to detect hidden alterations of the chip, e.g., inserted or weakened wires or transistors which cause the chip to fail later in the field.

由于全球经济压力，制造先进的综合电路（IC）正在迁移到外国铸造厂。对于许多无工厂的公司和政府机构来说，将其设计用于低成本制造已成为普遍的趋势。这些趋势引起了人们对美国军事系统，关键站点甚至依赖高性能芯片的家用电器的可能威胁或攻击的严重关注。由于硬件流程的恶意改变可能使这些重要系统无法在未来的某个时间无法使用，因此存在各种潜在的漏洞。无法容忍在美国武器系统中安装的IC的恶意操纵。这项研究的重点是开发自动测试模式生成（ATPG）和用于检测和定位恶意改变的信号分析技术，例如在晶圆探针AOR套件测试中，插入特洛伊木马电路，以提高芯片的可信度水平。特别是，研究了检测和定位木马电路的静态电流和瞬时电流技术的分辨率的技术。 该项目的第二个重点是旨在检测芯片隐藏变化的ATPG方法的开发，例如，插入或削弱的电线或晶体管，这会导致芯片以后在现场失败。