TC: Small: Collaborative Research: Exploration and Validation of Hardware Primitives for Security and Trust

TC：小型：协作研究：安全性和信任的硬件原语的探索和验证

• 批准号: 1114189
• 负责人: James Plusquellic
• 金额: $ 13.66万
• 依托单位: University of New Mexico
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-07-31 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1114189&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Collaborative; Research; Exploration

Hardware-level security and trust in many of society's microelectronic-based infrastructures, e.g., transportation, energy, etc., is inadequate. This project investigates chip-level hardware primitives that are designed to improve the security and trust in such systems. In particular, many security mechanisms depend on a secret, unique identifier that is associated with the chip or board in the system. An embedded digital signature inserted by the manufacturer is not secure because it can be extracted by adversaries. A physical unclonable function (PUF) is a recent approach for providing an entire set of secure, unique identifiers for each chip. PUFs are chip-level primitives that leverage the intrinsic and random manufacturing variations of the process technology. A PUF that measures the resistance variations in the chip's power grid is investigated as a hardware primitive for providing secure, unique identifiers. Similarly, integrated circuit trust relates to the degree of confidence one has that a fabricated instance of a chip implements only those functions described in the original specification -- nothing more and nothing less. There are increasing opportunities for adversaries to secretly change a chip's function given the trend of the industry to disseminate the chip fabrication process over many organizations. "Trust but verify" is likely the only approach to dealing with this threat. To support this verification process, a set of hardware primitives are investigated that are designed to measure the parametric, analog characteristics of chip as a means of detecting any malicious logic that might have been inserted by an adversary. A chip built in an advanced technology is used to experimentally validate the PUF and hardware Trojan detection methods.

硬件级别的安全性和对许多社会基于微电子基础设施的信任，例如运输，能源等。该项目研究了旨在提高对此类系统的安全性和信任的芯片级硬件原始图。特别是，许多安全机制取决于与系统中芯片或板相关的秘密，唯一的标识符。制造商插入的嵌入式数字签名是不安全的，因为它可以由对手提取。物理上的不元件功能（PUF）是最近为每个芯片提供一组安全，唯一标识符的方法。 PUF是芯片级别的原始词，可利用工艺技术的内在和随机制造变化。测量芯片功率网格中电阻变化的PUF被研究为用于提供安全，唯一标识符的硬件原始性。 同样，集成电路信任与一个置信度有关，即芯片的捏造实例仅在原始规范中描述的那些功能 - 仅此而已。鉴于该行业在许多组织上传播芯片制造过程的趋势，对手有越来越多的机会秘密改变芯片的功能。 “信任但验证”可能是应对这种威胁的唯一方法。为了支持此验证过程，研究了一组旨在测量芯片的参数，模拟特性的硬件原始图，作为检测对手可能插入的任何恶意逻辑的手段。使用先进技术建造的芯片用于实验验证PUF和硬件特洛伊木马检测方法。