CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Incentives, Insurance and Audited Reputation: An Economic Approach to Controlling Spam

CT-ISG：合作研究：激励、保险和审计声誉：控制垃圾邮件的经济方法

• 批准号: 0830852
• 负责人: Manoj Parameswaran
• 金额: $ 7.6万
• 依托单位: Santa Clara University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-01-01 至 2010-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0830852&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CT; ISG; Collaborative; Research; Incentives

The Internet is plagued by security problems including spam, threatening its legitimate role as the engine of growth in the new millennium. While technology makes admirable progress against cyber-security problems, the problem is not one of technology alone. Cyber security is part of a framework that encompasses technological, economic and social issues. The availability of technological solutions needs to be supplemented by service providers accepting responsibility for deploying technologies efficiently. Deployment of solutions and assignment of responsibility today tend to focus on a network provider's accountability to its own customers. In the decentralized Internet, allocation of accountability for potential impact on a remote network is important. This research seeks to direct investments to minimize impact on destination networks by efficient allocation of incentives. Security threats render the Internet a risky environment, and insurance mechanisms can seek to enhance productive and secure use of the Internet by risk management. This project uses game theoretic models to study allocation of incentives among mail service providers to reduce global incidence of spam. This project will develop incentive and insurance mechanisms with the provision for certifying providers who voluntarily accept responsibility for damage to rest of the network, conduct empirical studies of the patterns of spam observed on Internet today for refining the analytical model, and experimentally test and validate the mechanisms and model. This research seeks to start an evolution of the Internet into an accountable and well-organized environment

互联网受到包括垃圾邮件在内的安全问题的困扰，威胁到其作为新千年增长引擎的合法作用。尽管技术在针对网络安全问题方面取得了令人钦佩的进步，但问题并不是技术之一。网络安全是涵盖技术，经济和社会问题的框架的一部分。服务提供商接受有效部署技术的责任需要补充技术解决方案的可用性。当今的解决方案和责任分配的部署倾向于关注网络提供商对其客户的责任。在分散的互联网中，对远程网络的潜在影响的问责制分配很重要。这项研究试图通过有效分配激励措施来指导投资，以最大程度地减少对目的地网络的影响。安全威胁使互联网成为一个风险的环境，保险机制可以通过风险管理来增强互联网的生产和安全利用。 该项目使用游戏理论模型来研究邮件服务提供商之间激励措施的分配，以减少全球垃圾邮件的发生率。该项目将开发激励和保险机制，并提供认证的提供者，他们自愿承担对网络其余部分损害的责任，对今天在Internet上观察到的垃圾邮件模式进行的经验研究，以完善分析模型，并通过实验测试和验证机制和模型。这项研究旨在将互联网发展为一个负责任且组织良好的环境