Economic Theories of the Firm - 2

企业经济理论 - 2

• 批准号: 9022792
• 负责人: Paul Milgrom
• 金额: $ 14.32万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-07-01 至 1994-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9022792&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economic; Theories; Firm

This is an accomplishment-based renewal of the research of one of the most creative, influential and productive scholars in the modern economic theory of industrial organizations. The primary emphasis in this project will be on studying the interactions between the co-evolution of manufacturing firms, their suppliers, technologies, and organization forms and on the problems of coordination and strategy in the presence of returns to scale, complementarities, and "design dependence." A second emphasis will be on the incentives at work in firms and how compensation contracts, jobs, authority relations and decision processes are designed in light of these problems. A third emphasis will be on the evolution of modern institutions for supporting exchanges and how these affected the evolution of the modern firm. The first part of the project represents a major new direction of research that should develop into a fruitful and exciting area of economic theory. Research completed under the previous NSF grant on individual firms provides a new theory of discrete organizational design with the extent of communications with customers as the major design variable. Profit maximizing firms are shown to choose one of two different and complementary organizational structures: a low inventory, extensive communication organization or a high inventory, low communication system. The low inventory firms differ from high inventory firms in the same environment in that they have higher rates of new product introduction, more flexible production technologies (e.g., robotics), greater reliance on subcontractors, and more general training for workers. The next phase of the research will be to expand this theory to study the evolution of manufacturing systems and other activities across firms and eventually to develop a rigorous economic theory of the role of management.

这是对现代工业组织经济理论中最具创造力，最有影响力和生产力的学者之一的研究的续签。 该项目的主要重点将是研究制造公司，其供应商，技术和组织形式的共同发展之间的相互作用，以及在有回报的规模，互补性和“设计依赖性”的回报率的情况下，协调和策略的问题。 第二个重点将放在公司工作中的激励措施以及如何根据这些问题设计薪酬，工作，权威关系和决策过程。 第三强的重点将放在现代机构的发展上，以支持交流以及这些如何影响现代公司的发展。 该项目的第一部分代表了一个主要的研究方向，应该发展成为经济理论的富有成果和令人兴奋的领域。 在以前的NSF赠款上完成的个人公司完成的研究提供了一种新的离散组织设计理论，与客户作为主要设计变量的沟通程度。 最大化公司的利润可供选择，可以选择两个不同的互补组织结构之一：库存低，广泛的通信组织或较高的库存，低通信系统。 低库存公司在相同的环境下与高库存公司不同，因为它们具有更高的新产品介绍率，更灵活的生产技术（例如机器人技术），对分包商的更大依赖以及对工人的更多一般培训。 该研究的下一个阶段将是扩大这一理论，以研究跨公司制造系统和其他活动的演变，并最终开发出管理管理作用的严格经济理论。