ITR: Collaborative Research: (EVS + ASE) - Soc + int): Electronic Auction Markets

ITR：协作研究：(EVS ASE) - Soc int)：电子拍卖市场

• 批准号: 0427770
• 负责人: Paul Milgrom
• 金额: $ 44.01万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-09-15 至 2007-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0427770&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ITR; Collaborative; Research; EVS; ASE

This project studies electronic auction markets by integrating theoretical and experimental approaches, with particular attention to package auctions and exchanges. In package auctions, participants bid for bundles consisting of multiple items. In package exchanges, participants bid to buy, sell, or swap packages of items. For example, the Federal Communications Commission staff is currently evaluating the use of a package exchange to reallocate spectrum rights among new and existing users. An existing user might offer $X to its license with characteristics A for another license with characteristics B. Intellectual Merit: Package auctions as described above are distributed systems for resource allocation using human participants, extensive communications, and complex optimizations. The potential gains include improvements in high value resources allocations and even in life-savings applications. Moreover, the design of new auctions is a complex engineering task that must account for human behavior as well as communication and computation demands. This research will address all of the issues involved in successfully implementing package auctions and exchanges and related mechanisms. Among the many objectives, the investigators plan to (1) create new experiments to test the theory's predictions, such as the recent Ausubel-Milgrom prediction that outcomes are core allocations, (2) identify theoretically the communication and computation demands of resource allocation mechanisms in several kinds of environments, (3) evaluate experimentally how the environment, bidder characteristics and bidder tools affect the outcomes, (4) develop (distance) metrics that allow researchers to compare actual bidder behavior both to the predictions of theory and to the behaviors required for the mechanism to achieve performance targets, (5) compare (theoretically and experimentally) the performance of different market mechanisms, both static and dynamic, and (6) examine (both theoretically and experimentally) the effect of package evaluation costs on bidder behavior and auction performance.Broader Impacts: Auctions and exchanges with package bidding can result in dramatic improvements in resource allocations compared to traditional designs in many high-value settings. Static package auctions have already been used for business procurement; the US Federal Communications Commission is exploring dynamic package auctions and exchanges to reallocate radio spectrum rights to much higher valued uses. In addition, auction-like mechanisms that do not use cash transfers promise great improvements for important transactions, such as life-saving organ swaps that help patients and donors improve the tissue matches and increase the chance that transplants will succeed, and school matching procedures that assign children to schools and avoid the kind of chaos experienced, for example, by New York City high schools in 2003.

该项目通过整合理论和实验方法来研究电子拍卖市场，并特别关注包装拍卖和交流。在包装拍卖中，参与者竞标由多个项目组成的捆绑包。在包装交换中，参与者要购买，出售或交换商品包装。例如，联邦通信委员会的工作人员目前正在评估使用软件包交换来重新分配新用户和现有用户之间的光谱权。现有用户可能会在其许可证上提供$ x，并具有特征A的特征A具有特征B.知识功绩：如上所述的包装拍卖是使用人类参与者，广泛的通信和复杂优化的分布式系统用于资源分配。潜在的收益包括改善高价值资源分配，甚至在挽救生命的应用程序中。此外，新拍卖的设计是一项复杂的工程任务，必须说明人类行为以及沟通和计算需求。这项研究将解决成功实施包装拍卖和交流和相关机制的所有问题。在许多目标中，调查人员计划（1）创建新的实验来测试理论的预测，例如最近的Ausubel-Milgrom预测结果是结果是核心分配，（2）从理论上确定资源分配机制的沟通和计算需求，在几种环境中的脉冲和次要范围（3）评估环境和BIDDERTERICTY（BIDDERSISTIONS），该工具（3）允许研究人员可以比较实际投标的行为与理论的预测以及实现绩效目标所需的行为的指标，（5）比较（理论上和实验上）（理论上和实验上）静态和动态的不同市场机制的性能，以及（6）检查（理论上和实验性地评估和交易所评估的效果）。与许多高价值环境中的传统设计相比，竞标可能会导致资源分配的显着改善。静态包装拍卖已经用于业务采购；美国联邦通信委员会正在探索动态包装拍卖和交流，以将无线电频谱权重新分配给更高的有价值用途。此外，不使用现金转移的类似拍卖机制有助于重要的交易，例如挽救生命的器官互换，可以帮助患者和捐助者改善组织匹配，并增加移植成功的机会，以及将儿童分配给学校的学校匹配程序，并避免在2003年受到纽约市高级学校的方式。