ITR: Collaborative Research: (EVS + ASE) - Soc + int): Electronic Auction Markets

ITR：协作研究：(EVS ASE) - Soc int)：电子拍卖市场

• 批准号: 0427770
• 负责人: Paul Milgrom
• 金额: $ 44.01万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-09-15 至 2007-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0427770&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ITR; Collaborative; Research; EVS; ASE

This project studies electronic auction markets by integrating theoretical and experimental approaches, with particular attention to package auctions and exchanges. In package auctions, participants bid for bundles consisting of multiple items. In package exchanges, participants bid to buy, sell, or swap packages of items. For example, the Federal Communications Commission staff is currently evaluating the use of a package exchange to reallocate spectrum rights among new and existing users. An existing user might offer $X to its license with characteristics A for another license with characteristics B. Intellectual Merit: Package auctions as described above are distributed systems for resource allocation using human participants, extensive communications, and complex optimizations. The potential gains include improvements in high value resources allocations and even in life-savings applications. Moreover, the design of new auctions is a complex engineering task that must account for human behavior as well as communication and computation demands. This research will address all of the issues involved in successfully implementing package auctions and exchanges and related mechanisms. Among the many objectives, the investigators plan to (1) create new experiments to test the theory's predictions, such as the recent Ausubel-Milgrom prediction that outcomes are core allocations, (2) identify theoretically the communication and computation demands of resource allocation mechanisms in several kinds of environments, (3) evaluate experimentally how the environment, bidder characteristics and bidder tools affect the outcomes, (4) develop (distance) metrics that allow researchers to compare actual bidder behavior both to the predictions of theory and to the behaviors required for the mechanism to achieve performance targets, (5) compare (theoretically and experimentally) the performance of different market mechanisms, both static and dynamic, and (6) examine (both theoretically and experimentally) the effect of package evaluation costs on bidder behavior and auction performance.Broader Impacts: Auctions and exchanges with package bidding can result in dramatic improvements in resource allocations compared to traditional designs in many high-value settings. Static package auctions have already been used for business procurement; the US Federal Communications Commission is exploring dynamic package auctions and exchanges to reallocate radio spectrum rights to much higher valued uses. In addition, auction-like mechanisms that do not use cash transfers promise great improvements for important transactions, such as life-saving organ swaps that help patients and donors improve the tissue matches and increase the chance that transplants will succeed, and school matching procedures that assign children to schools and avoid the kind of chaos experienced, for example, by New York City high schools in 2003.

该项目通过结合理论和实验方法来研究电子拍卖市场，特别关注打包拍卖和交易。在打包拍卖中，参与者竞标包含多个物品的捆绑包。在包裹交换中，参与者出价购买、出售或交换物品包裹。例如，联邦通信委员会工作人员目前正在评估使用包交换在新用户和现有用户之间重新分配频谱权利。现有用户可能会为其具有特征 A 的许可证提供 X 美元，以获得另一个具有特征 B 的许可证。 智力价值：如上所述的包拍卖是使用人类参与者、广泛通信和复杂优化进行资源分配的分布式系统。潜在的收益包括改善高价值资源分配，甚至改善救生应用。此外，新拍卖的设计是一项复杂的工程任务，必须考虑人类行为以及通信和计算需求。这项研究将解决成功实施一揽子拍卖和交易及相关机制所涉及的所有问题。在众多目标中，研究人员计划（1）创建新的实验来测试该理论的预测，例如最近的 Ausubel-Milgrom 预测，即结果是核心分配，（2）从理论上确定资源分配机制的通信和计算需求。几种环境，(3) 通过实验评估环境、投标人特征和投标人工具如何影响结果，(4) 开发（距离）指标，使研究人员能够将实际投标人行为与理论预测和所需行为进行比较对于实现绩效目标的机制，（5）比较（理论和实验）不同静态和动态市场机制的绩效，以及（6）检查（理论和实验）包评估成本对投标人行为的影响和拍卖表现。更广泛的影响：与许多高价值环境中的传统设计相比，采用打包投标的拍卖和交换可以显着改善资源分配。静态包裹拍卖已用于企业采购；美国联邦通信委员会正在探索动态打包拍卖和交换，以将无线电频谱权利重新分配给更高价值的用途。此外，不使用现金转移的类似拍卖的机制有望大大改善重要交易，例如帮助患者和捐赠者改善组织匹配并增加移植成功机会的挽救生命的器官交换，以及学校匹配程序将孩子分配到学校并避免2003年纽约市高中所经历的那种混乱。