Auction Design for Complex Centralized Markets

复杂集中市场的拍卖设计

基本信息

批准号：
1947514
负责人：
Paul Milgrom
金额：
$ 27.7万
依托单位：
Stanford University
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2020
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2020-09-01 至 2024-08-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1947514&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Auction Design Complex Centralized Markets

项目摘要

This project will use economic theory and simulations to study, develop, and improve practically implementable auction designs for complex centralized markets. The project will contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness of auction designs that have been used in recent years to sell packages of radio spectrum, electrical power, internet advertising opportunities, and fishing rights. As our understanding of these kinds of markets has grown, we have come to understand that these market methods must be adjusted to simplify communication and computational complexity and allow for specific features such as economics of scale, very numerous differentiated goods, and exposure risks. This award funds research that will develop methods to evaluate and improve recent auction designs and to create entirely new designs.Markets with combinatorial valuations and/or specialized constraints introduce complexity that limits the effectiveness of current auction methods. Under well-known assumptions, market allocations are efficient. However, even when there are no externalities, information asymmetries, or market power, market-clearing prices may fail to exist, may not be unique, or may not be easily computable. In these cases, decentralized economic systems that are guided by market prices may be dynamically unstable. The project will consider the optimal organization of practical exchanges when this is a possibility. Even when market-clearing prices do not exist, auction mechanisms that combine prices and rationing can lead to nearly optimal results. One part of this project will characterize and evaluate the performance of such mechanisms. Sometimes when market clearing resource prices do in fact exist, the relevant resources are so numerous and differentiated that auctions are impractical. Another part of this project will decide how to apply prices in these settings to meet societal goals.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该项目将使用经济理论和仿真来研究，开发和改善为复杂的集中市场的实际实施拍卖设计。该项目将有助于我们理解近年来用于销售无线电频谱，电力，互联网广告机会和捕鱼权的拍卖设计有效性。随着我们对这类市场的理解，我们已经了解到，必须调整这些市场方法以简化沟通和计算复杂性，并允许特定的特征，例如规模经济，非常差异化的商品和风险。该奖项资金研究将开发评估和改善最近拍卖设计并创建全新设计的方法。具有组合估值和/或专业约束的市场引入了复杂性，从而限制了当前拍卖方法的有效性。在众所周知的假设下，市场分配是有效的。但是，即使没有外部性，信息不对称或市场能力，市场清算价格也可能不存在，也可能不是唯一的，也可能不容易计算。在这些情况下，以市场价格指导的分散经济体系可能会动态不稳定。该项目将在可能的情况下考虑实践交流的最佳组织。即使不存在市场清算价格，结合价格和配给的拍卖机制也会导致几乎最佳的结果。该项目的一部分将表征和评估此类机制的性能。有时，当市场清算资源价格实际上确实存在时，相关资源是如此之多且区分，以至于拍卖是不切实际的。该项目的另一部分将决定如何在这些环境中运用价格以实现社会目标。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响评估标准来评估值得支持的。