'Evaluate the impact of the Jewish insurgency between 1945 & 1948 in effecting the British Governments decision to withdraw from Mandate Palestine.'

“评估 1945 年间犹太叛乱的影响

• 批准号: 2438822
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2438822
• 关键词: Evaluate; impact; Jewish; insurgency; between

In early 1947, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign secretary, informed the Defence Committee that staying in Palestine was of great importance if ample oil were to continue to flow to Britain. The Chiefs of Staff agreed, concluding that 'handing over the Mandate [would lead to a loss of] our predominant position in the Middle East.' Yet, on the 20th September 1947, the British cabinet voted to withdraw from Palestine. Why? Writing on the reasons for the British evacuation of Palestine, the respected Mandate historian, Motti Golani declares that 'the question of "who expelled the British from Palestine" has long since ceased to engage historians of the late British Mandate period.' In Golani's reading (shared by many other historians of the Mandate) the Jewish insurgency played very little role in ending British rule in Palestine. Instead, the historiography treats the end of the Mandate as symptomatic of a rapid & irreversible collapse of the British Empire, brought about by Britain's weak economic position after 1945. Add to this American pressure, the Labour party's ostensible will to decolonise & a desire by both Labour & the populace to focus on domestic issues & the traditional argument is complete. My research at BA & MA level has led me to the conclusion that the conventional historiography does not accurately portray the impact of the insurgency & therefore needs revaluating. The historiography tends to focus on physical destruction caused by the insurgency, dismissing this cost as a drop in the water in terms of Britain's post-war problems. However, my work would cast a wider net. Section of my thesis would deal with the impact of the insurgency on the morale of the British in Palestine (army personnel, police, civil servants & administrators), the public reaction to events in Palestine as well as what impact the declining morale of the British in Palestine & public outrage & hysteria had on those with power & influence: the government, parliament, civil servants & the top echelons of the administration in Palestine, such as the last High Commissioner. It will also be necessary to devote space to studying the economic situation of Britain post-war & the overall financial impact of the insurgency. By 1947, Britain was spending £30 million per annum on the police & £40 million on military upkeep in Palestine. By considering social, political & economic points of view my research will avoid becoming merely 'political history', 'bottom up history', instead offering a holistic view of the insurgency.The various facets of my research requires the use of primary source material available in the UK & in Israel. With regards to the morale of the army & police force, the Middle East Centre Archive at St Anthony's College is indispensable. Interviews carried out with ex-members of the police & army in Palestine offer a first-hand insight into the period by those who experienced the insurgency at close quarters. For the more difficult task of ascertaining the attitude of the British public to events in Palestine, I believe the Mass Observation surveys, held at Sussex University, are of particular use. The organization gathered data from a diverse range of people from varying classes, cities & of political views, giving a more comprehensive picture of what 'the people' thought. Also of use are letters columns in newspapers & diaries from the period. Both contain expressions of frustration & anger over the insurgency. Political & economic documents also need to be examined. All of these resources, taken together as a single body, are invaluable for challenging the existing historiography by authors working in both English & Hebrew. Regarding Hebrew sources, the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, the Central Zionist Archives, the National Library of Israel & the Jabotinsky Institute all hold useful primary materials which deal with the insurgent's tactics, aims and contact between the various groups

1947 年初，英国外交大臣欧内斯特·贝文 (Ernest Bevin) 通知国防委员会，如果要让充足的石油继续流向英国，留在巴勒斯坦就非常重要。失去我们在中东的主导地位。”然而，1947 年 9 月 20 日，英国内阁投票决定从巴勒斯坦撤军，原因是这样的。受人尊敬的托管历史学家莫蒂·戈拉尼 (Motti Golani) 宣称，“谁将英国人驱逐出巴勒斯坦”的问题早已不再是英国托管时期晚期历史学家的关注点（许多其他历史学家也认同这一观点）。托管地）犹太叛乱在结束英国对巴勒斯坦的统治方面发挥了很小的作用，相反，史学将托管地的结束视为快速和结束的征兆。 1945年后英国经济地位疲弱导致大英帝国不可逆转的崩溃。加上美国的压力，工党表面上的去殖民化意愿以及工党和民众都希望关注国内问题，传统的论点已经完成我在学士和硕士阶段的研究使我得出这样的结论：传统的史学不能准确地描述叛乱的影响，因此需要重新评估。然而，我的论文的一部分将讨论叛乱对英国的影响。英国在巴勒斯坦的士气（军队人员、警察、公务员和行政人员）、公众对巴勒斯坦事件的反应以及英国在巴勒斯坦士气的下降以及公众的愤怒和歇斯底里对巴勒斯坦人的影响权力和影响力：政府、议会、公务员和巴勒斯坦行政高层，例如最后一任高级专员。还需要花篇幅来研究英国战后的经济状况和整体金融状况。到 1947 年，英国每年在巴勒斯坦的警察开支上花费 3000 万英镑，在军事维持上花费 4000 万英镑。通过考虑社会、政治和经济的观点，我的研究将避免仅仅成为“政治史”。 “自下而上的历史”，而不是提供叛乱的整体观点。我的研究的各个方面需要使用英国和以色列的主要来源材料，关于军队和警察部队的士气，中间。圣安东尼学院东部中心档案馆对巴勒斯坦前警察和军队成员进行的采访为那些近距离经历叛乱的人提供了对这一时期的第一手资料。为了确定英国公众对巴勒斯坦事件的态度，我相信在苏塞克斯大学进行的大规模观察调查特别有用，该组织从不同阶层、城市和政治观点的不同人群中收集了数据，给出了结果。更全面地了解“人民”的想法也很有用，报纸和日记中的信件专栏都包含了对叛乱的不满和愤怒，所有这些都需要审查。资源，综合起来作为一个整体，对于挑战英语和希伯来语作者现有的史学编纂学来说，梅纳赫姆·贝京遗产中心、中央犹太复国主义档案馆、以色列国家图书馆和雅博廷斯基研究所都拥有有用的原始材料。涉及叛乱分子的策略、目标以及各团体之间的联系