Justification and Probability

理由和概率

• 批准号: AH/L009633/1
• 负责人: Martin Smith
• 金额: $ 8.09万
• 依托单位: University of Glasgow
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2014 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL009633%2F1
• 关键词: Justification; Probability

Under what conditions are we justified in believing something? A very simple and natural answer to this question is that we are justified in believing something when it is sufficiently likely to be true. Managing one's beleiefs in a reasonable and responsible manner is all about minimising the risk of error. As simple and natural as this answer seems, however, I believe it to be mistaken.Suppose that 100 people attended a concert but we know that only one ticket was ever sold. As such, we know that only one of the people at the concert attended legitimately and the other 99 were gatecrashers. Suppose we know that Joe was one of the people who attended the concert but have no further information about him. Clearly, in light of our evidence, it's very likely that Joe was a gatecrasher. But should I really draw the conclusion that Joe was a gatecrasher and treat him accordingly? Should I go about asserting that Joe was a gatecrasher - should I inform his friends, his family, his employer for instance? Should Joe be arrested and convicted and appropriate punishment applied to him? Most of us would agree that this would be exceedingly unfair and, under prevailing legal practice, statistical evidence of this kind would not be deemed a legitimate basis for a conviction.But if I'm not justified in believing that Joe was a gatecrasher, then justification is not simply a matter of likelihood after all - there must be more to it than this. Interestingly, if an eye-witness claimed that she saw Joe scaling the fence to get into the concert then we would generally have no qualms about believing that Joe was a gatecrasher and acting accordingly - and such evidence could well be deemed a legitimate basis for conviction in a court. And yet, we're all aware that testimony is fallible - the eye-witness could be lying or mistaken. Indeed the probability that Joe was a gatecrasher given that a witness testified that she saw him scaling a fence is plausibly not as high as 99%. My primary aim in this project is to try and get to the bottom of this puzzle and, in so doing, come to a new understanding of what it takes to be justified in believing something. The research is relevant not just to epistemologists and academic philosophers but to anyone who has wondered what to believe about a given topic or how to evaluate a given piece of evidence. As the above example suggests, the research also has a bearing on questions about how best to understand and rationalise our legal practices. I aim to publish the results of this research in a monograph and a research paper. The research will be conducted primarily in Scotland and in collaboration with a number of philosophers working throughout Scotland. Scotland, at present, boasts a number of high profile philosophy departments and research centres with particular strength in epistemology.

在什么条件下，我们有理由相信某事？这个问题的一个非常简单自然的答案是，当它足够真实的情况下，我们可以相信某件事是有道理的。以合理且负责任的方式管理自己的主意是为了最大程度地减少错误风险。但是，我认为这是一个简单而自然的答案，我认为这是错误的。要求100人参加音乐会，但我们知道只有一张票被卖了。因此，我们知道，音乐会上只有一个人参加了合法的参加，而另外99名是加特切尔人。假设我们知道乔是参加音乐会但没有更多信息的人之一。显然，鉴于我们的证据，乔很可能是一名加特克拉舍。但是，我是否应该得出结论，乔是一名盖特克拉舍尔并相应地对待他？我应该断言乔是一个加特克拉舍尔 - 例如，我应该告诉他的朋友，他的家人，他的雇主吗？乔是否应该被逮捕，定罪并适用于他？我们大多数人都同意，这将是极其不公平的，在经过普遍的法律实践下，这种信念的统计证据不会被认为是合理的基础，但是如果我没有有理由相信乔是盖特克拉舍司机，那么毕竟有理由就不简单地理由了 - 比这比这更重要。有趣的是，如果目击者声称她看到乔在围栏上缩放围栏以参加音乐会，那么我们通常不会相信乔是盖特克拉舍师并采取了相应的行动 - 而且这种证据很可能被认为是在法庭上定罪的合法依据。但是，我们都知道证词是可犯错的 - 目击者可能是撒谎或错误。确实，乔是一名加特克拉舍尔的概率，因为目击者作证说她看到他在围栏上缩放的可能性不高99％。我在这个项目中的主要目的是尝试到达这个难题的底部，并在这样做时对相信某事所需要的合理性有了新的了解。这项研究不仅与认识论家和学术哲学家有关，而且与任何想知道对给定主题有什么看法或如何评估给定证据的人有关。正如上面示例所表明的那样，该研究还与如何最好地理解和合理化我们的法律实践有关。我的目标是在专着和研究论文中发布这项研究的结果。这项研究将主要在苏格兰进行，并与苏格兰工作的许多哲学家合作。目前，苏格兰拥有许多知名的哲学部门和研究中心，具有认识论方面的特殊优势。

项目成果

The Hardest Paradox for Closure

关闭最难的悖论

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Erkenntnis
• 影响因子: 0.9
• 作者: Smith, M.

More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof

有关规范支持和刑事证明标准的更多信息

• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab005
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Mind
• 影响因子: 1.8
• 作者: Smith M

The logic of epistemic justification.

认知论证的逻辑。

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1422-z
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: Synthese
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Smith M

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

在概率和确定性之间：什么证明了信念的合理性

• 发表时间: 2016
• 作者: M Smith

Coin trials

硬币试验

• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2017.1381936
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
• 影响因子: 0.9
• 作者: Smith M