An INUS theory of causal conditional reasoning

因果条件推理的 INUS 理论

• 批准号: 262770274
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Karl Christoph Klauer
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Abteilung Sozialpsychologie und Methodenlehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Priority Programmes
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2013-12-31 至 2018-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/262770274?language=en
• 关键词: INUS; theory; causal; conditional; reasoning

An INUS theory of causal conditional reasoning is proposed. It builds on Mackie's (1980) analysis of causes as causally prior INUS (i.e., insufficient but non-redundant parts of unnecessary but sufficient) conditions and addresses reasoning with causal conditionals of the form "If cause A is present, then the effect B occurs." According to the INUS theory, causal conditionals are interpreted as asserting that A is a causally prior INUS condition for B implying that "AX or Y if and only if B" with complementary necessary conditions X and alternative causes Y left largely implicit and unspecified, but by default assumed to be true (X) and false or of unknown truth value (Y), respectively. The INUS theory accounts for findings from the classical (deductive) and the new (probabilistic) paradigm of conditional reasoning within a common framework. Predictions are tested regarding the classical paradigm (1), the new paradigm (2-3), and their interrelationship (4): 1) The theory predicts a rich range of different inference patterns in the classical suppression paradigm (Byrne, 1989). 2) The theory predicts that documented discrepancies from the norms of probability (e.g., the neglect of alternative causes in so-called probabilistic modus ponens; Fernbach & Erb, 2013) can be eliminated if reasoners' interpretation of the questions put to them is taken into account. 3) The theory challenges the empirically well-supported "Equation" (P(If A, then B) = P(B | A)) in the new paradigm. 4) The theory predicts new, as yet undiscovered, dissociations between the classical and the new paradigms to occur in suppression-paradigm experiments.

提出了因果条件推理的INU理论。它基于Mackie（1980）的原因分析是因果关系（即不必要但不必要但足够的不足的部分）条件的原因，并以“如果存在原因A，则效果B发生，以解决形式的因果条件来解决推理。”根据INUS理论，因果条件被解释为断言A是b的因果事前的INUS条件，暗示“ AX或Y时，并且仅在B中仅使用B”，其互补的必要条件X和其他条件X和替代性会导致Y剩下的隐范，并且在很大程度上不指定，但默认值为真实（X）和未知的（X）和不知名的真实性价值（y）。 INUS理论解释了经典（演绎）和新的（概率）在共同框架内的有条件推理的发现。对经典范式（1），新范式（2-3）及其相互关系的预测进行了测试（4）：1）该理论预测了经典抑制范式中不同推理模式的丰富范围（Byrne，1989）。 2）该理论预测，如果理论者对提出的问题的解释，可以考虑到所谓的概率概率模式浮游； 3）该理论在新范式中挑战了经验良好支持的“方程式”（p（如果a，b）= p（b | a））。 4）该理论预测了经典范式与新范式之间在抑制范式实验中发生的新的解离。