AF: Small: How to Let an Adversary Compute for You

AF：小：如何让对手为你计算

• 批准号: 1116702
• 负责人: Tal Malkin
• 金额: $ 35万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-01 至 2014-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1116702&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: AF; Small; How; Let; Adversary

The Internet revolution enabled private users across the world to send and receive messages to one another. Coupled with cryptographic techniques like public key encryption and digital signatures, this gave rise to the development of the world wide web, e-commerce, and so many other technological changes that we routinely take for granted today. We are now facing a second revolution in which we are changing not just how we communicate, but how we compute. More and more we are sending large datasets to untrusted servers, having them perform calculations on our behalf. From our cell phones and our GPS units, we send compromising information to our service providers in order to outsource the computation that we cannot do on-the-go. Cryptography has a new role to play in these emerging environments.The PI intends to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the cryptographic challenges that arise in this context. The proposed directions of research touch on the following questions:-- How can we safely allow others to perform computation on our encrypted data while maintaining its privacy?-- How can we verify that outsourced computation was done correctly?-- What stronger security models are needed in this new, highly interactive environment?The PI will address the theoretical aspects of these problems, including modeling, protocol design, and negative results. As part of her investigations, PI will study the powerful cryptographic primitives of fully homomorphic encryption and functional encryption (in particular, the relationship between them and outsourced and verifiable computations), as well as the area of leakage-resilient cryptography.

互联网革命使世界各地的私人用户能够相互发送和接收消息。 再加上公钥加密和数字签名等加密技术，这引发了万维网、电子商务以及许多我们今天通常认为理所当然的其他技术变革的发展。 我们现在面临着第二次革命，我们不仅改变我们的沟通方式，而且改变我们的计算方式。 我们越来越多地将大型数据集发送到不受信任的服务器，让它们代表我们执行计算。 我们通过手机和 GPS 设备向服务提供商发送泄露信息，以便将我们无法随时随地进行的计算外包出去。 密码学在这些新兴环境中发挥着新的作用。PI 打算探索在此背景下出现的密码学挑战的理论基础。 拟议的研究方向涉及以下问题：--我们如何安全地允许其他人对我们的加密数据进行计算，同时维护其隐私？--我们如何验证外包计算是否正确完成？--什么更强的安全模型在这个新的、高度交互的环境中需要什么？PI 将解决这些问题的理论方面，包括建模、协议设计和负面结果。 作为调查的一部分，PI 将研究完全同态加密和函数加密的强大密码原语（特别是它们与外包和可验证计算之间的关系），以及抗泄漏密码学领域。