Collaborative Research: It's Not (Just) About the Money

合作研究：这不仅仅是钱的问题

• 批准号: 1062055
• 负责人: Catherine Eckel
• 金额: $ 21.6万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Dallas
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-04-15 至 2013-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1062055&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Just; About; Money

In this research project, the PIs will conduct laboratory experiments that examine the desire to ?do good? as an intrinsic motive for working. The experiments involve a new incentivized game setting where worker effort, instead of benefitting an employer?s profit, instead benefits a third party: a needy individual, a group of such individuals, or a public good. The experiments test the effects of incentive contracts (requests, rewards, and punishment) on productivity in these settings, and assess the potential for short-run and long-run crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards.This project is inspired by recent developments in economic theory. Economics is concerned with the extrinsic motivation provided by wages, which compensates for the disutility of work, while social and educational psychologists study intrinsic motivation, an inherent interest in the work itself. The prevailing finding of this research is that financial rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation. Economic theory that incorporates nonpecuniary motives ? such as self-esteem, identity, and status ? concludes that the compensation of intrinsically motivated workers will involve smaller incentive-based payments. This occurs in part because of the potential for crowding out, but in addition, low wages serve to limit the applicant pool to workers whose valuation of the organization?s mission is highest. While theory incorporates a broad set of intrinsic motives, most experimental research has focused on reciprocity between the agent and the principal. In experiments based on trust or gift-exchange, high wages elicit high effort on the part of workers, but the introduction of incentive contracts that involve monitoring and sanctions robustly crowds out such intrinsic reciprocity. Work environments where the worker?s effort produces a ?good? for someone other than the employer have not been tested previously. However, other motivations, such as altruism, may greatly impact effort choices in the workplace, particularly when the job involves positive externalities or some other form of ?doing good.? In these cases, incentive contracts may crowd out the desire to do good, as theory suggests, or may indeed reinforce intrinsic motivation. Exogenously changing employment contracts in the real world is difficult or impossible, making laboratory experiments an ideal method to address this issue. Broader significance and importance: In terms of broader impacts, the research will shed light on the interaction between worker motivation and the structure of employment contracts. When deciding to accept employment or exert effort on behalf of an employer, workers take into account not only the monetary compensation, but also the type of work and the mission of the organization. This project focuses on settings where nonpecuniary factors are key aspects of the job, and individuals make choices not only about ?doing well,? but also ?doing good.? Many important organizations exist to benefit third parties, and are most effective when they can attract and motivate workers who support their missions. Our work contributes to the development of institutions that foster altruism and cooperation among workers who work for a cause, and not just for the money. On a scientific level, our work contributes to understanding the impact of non-pecuniary motivations on decision making by individuals in a wide variety of settings. The project also implements and evaluates a mentoring component, which utilizes a novel structure and provides a valuable collaborative research experience to young scholars at all levels, from undergraduate students to post-doctoral scholars.

在这个研究项目中，PI 将进行实验室实验来检验“行善”的愿望。作为工作的内在动力。 这些实验涉及一种新的激励博弈设置，在该设置中，工人的努力不是有利于雇主的利润，而是有利于第三方：一个有需要的个人、一群这样的人或公共物品。 这些实验测试了激励契约（请求、奖励和惩罚）对这些环境中生产力的影响，并评估了外在奖励对内在动机的短期和长期挤出的可能性。该项目的灵感来自于最近的发展在经济理论中。 经济学关注的是工资提供的外在动机，它补偿了工作的负效用，而社会和教育心理学家研究的是内在动机，即对工作本身的内在兴趣。这项研究的普遍发现是，经济奖励挤出了内在动机。 包含非金钱动机的经济理论？例如自尊、身份和地位？得出的结论是，具有内在动机的员工的薪酬将涉及较小的基于激励的支付。 出现这种情况的部分原因是潜在的挤出效应，但除此之外，低工资也将申请人群体限制在对组织使命评价最高的工人身上。 虽然理论包含了广泛的内在动机，但大多数实验研究都集中在代理人和委托人之间的互惠上。在基于信任或礼物交换的实验中，高工资会引起工人的高度努力，但涉及监督和制裁的激励合同的引入强烈地排除了这种内在的互惠。 工人的努力产生“好处”的工作环境对于除雇主之外的其他人之前未接受过测试的人。然而，其他动机，例如利他主义，可能会极大地影响工作场所的努力选择，特别是当工作涉及积极的外部性或某种其他形式的“行善”时。在这些情况下，正如理论所表明的那样，激励契约可能会排挤行善的愿望，或者确实可能会增强内在动机。 在现实世界中外部改变雇佣合同是困难或不可能的，这使得实验室实验成为解决这个问题的理想方法。 更广泛的意义和重要性：就更广泛的影响而言，该研究将揭示工人动机与雇佣合同结构之间的相互作用。 在决定接受雇佣或代表雇主做出努力时，工人不仅要考虑金钱报酬，还要考虑工作类型和组织的使命。该项目重点关注非金钱因素是工作关键方面的环境，个人做出的选择不仅是“做得好”。但也“做得很好”。许多重要的组织都是为了使第三方受益而存在的，当它们能够吸引和激励支持其使命的员工时，它们才是最有效的。我们的工作有助于机构的发展，促进工人之间的利他主义和合作，这些工人为了事业而不仅仅是为了金钱而工作。 在科学层面上，我们的工作有助于理解非金钱动机对各种环境中个人决策的影响。该项目还实施和评估了指导部分，该部分采用新颖的结构，为从本科生到博士后学者的各个级别的年轻学者提供宝贵的合作研究经验。