Humanitarianism at the Border: Criminalisation of migrant search and rescue operations in Southern Europe

边境的人道主义：南欧移民搜救行动的刑事定罪

• 批准号: 2740951
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Aston University
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2740951
• 关键词: Humanitarianism; Border; Criminalisation; migrant; search

On August 2nd, approximately 45 persons had been in distress at sea for 6 days, drifting between the Maltese and Greek search and rescue (SAR) zones. Maritime authorities from both countries were alerted by the Alarmphone hotline, but both refused to assist (Alarmphone, 2022). This is business as usual. European authorities consistently refuse to uphold their duty to rescue persons in distress at sea by omitting assistance or delaying rescues. The European Union (EU) has invested in an expensive plan to avoid rescuing migrants at sea with the goal of preventing arrivals to the continent. Strategies include agreements with third countries to prevent crossings and switching their assets in the Mediterranean from ships to drones with no SAR obligations (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Even in Spain, the only EU country with a civil and public sea rescue agency, Spain's government has been implementing changes to the coordination of the agency that have led to delays in assistance, resulting in higher death rates (Luna Vives, 2021). Meanwhile, the EU's anti-fraud office revealed that the EU's Border and Coastguard Agency (Frontex) 'covered up and helped to finance illegal pushbacks of asylum-seekers in Greece' (Spiegel, 2022). Historically, 80% of the deaths and disappearances in the Mediterranean Sea have been recorded in the Central Mediterranean route (IOM, 2022). The death toll for 2022 in the same route has reached 907 victims, and it stands at over 20,000 known victims since 2014 (IOM, 2022). However, 'the reality is most likely to be worse, due to potential shipwrecks without witness' (SOS Mediterranée, Sea Watch and MSF, 2022). In this context, the role of SAR NGOs has switched from purely humanitarian to acting as witnesses of the consequences of European policies at sea, by 'bring[ing] evidence that it is not the sea that is killing people, but the EU border regime and its necropolitics' (Dadusc and Denaro, 2021). While it is clear that migrants are the ones facing the worst consequences of criminalisation, by being left to drown and disappear at sea or forcibly returned to Libya, SAR volunteers and workers are increasingly facing criminal persecution for their solidarity work. Five years ago, the first ship from the civil fleet was detained. The crew onboard the Iuventa was accused of 'aiding and abetting unauthorized entry into Italy' for rescuing 14,000 people from distress at sea between 2016-2017. Today, those charges haven't been dropped and, if convicted, they could face up to 20 years in prison. Besides detaining ships and opening criminal and administrative proceedings against SAR crew and NGOs, Southern European Member States are also finding other ways to hinder SAR capacity in the Mediterranean, for example, through Port State Control inspections. For the latter, however, an August 2022 ruling of the European Court of Justice has made clear that, while ship inspections are necessary, the detention of SAR NGO vessels cannot be subjected to arbitrary reasons, including for having 'too many' rescued people on board or for lacking certificates that do not exist under the ship's flag state (Sea Watch, 2022). These criminalisation attempts against activists and non-governmental organisations within the context of migration have long been identified by legal scholarship as part of crimmigration: a clear trend in the last 30 years describing the proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences imposed by states. Within this theoretical framework, the project investigates the criminalisation of voluntary search and rescue operations examining: 1) Regulations, practices and laws deriving from the EU Facilitators' package and states' interpretation of it, used to curtail and/or criminalise voluntary sea rescue; 2) How maritime volunteers conceptualise their roles and involvement in sea rescue; and, 3) Voluntary organisations operating sea rescue missions in the Mediterranean amid increasing restrictions.

8月2日，约45人在马耳他和希腊搜救区之间漂流，在海上遇险6天，两国海事当局接到报警电话热线报警，但两国均拒绝提供协助。 ，2022），欧洲当局一如既往地拒绝履行救援海上遇险人员的职责，而欧盟（EU）已投入了昂贵的资金。计划避免在海上营救移民，目的是阻止移民抵达非洲大陆。战略包括与第三国达成协议，防止其在地中海的资产从船只转移到不承担搜寻与援救义务的无人机（人权观察，2022）。西班牙是唯一拥有民用和公共海上救援机构的欧盟国家，西班牙政府一直在对该机构的协调进行改革，这导致了援助的延误，导致更高的死亡率（Luna Vives， 2021 年），欧盟反欺诈办公室透露，欧盟边境和海岸警卫队 (Frontex) “掩盖并帮助资助了希腊境内 80% 的非法寻求庇护者”（Spiegel，2022）。地中海中部航线已记录了地中海死亡和失踪人数（国际移民组织，2022 年），该航线的死亡人数已达到 2022 年。 907 名遇难者，自 2014 年以来已知遇难者人数超过 20,000 人（国际移民组织，2022 年）。然而，“由于可能发生没有目击者的沉船事故，现实情况很可能更糟”（SOS Mediterranee、Sea Watch 和 MSF，2022 年）。在此背景下，搜救非政府组织的作用已从纯粹的人道主义转向充当欧洲海上政策后果的见证人，通过“带来”有证据表明，杀人的不是海洋，而是欧盟边境制度及其死亡政治”（Dadusc 和 Denaro，2021），但很明显，移民面临着刑事定罪最严重的后果，他们被淹死。五年前，第一艘民用船“Iuventa”号上的船员被拘留。 2016 年至 2017 年间，他们因“协助和教唆未经授权进入意大利”而在海上救助了 14,000 名遇难者。如今，这些指控尚未被撤销，如果罪名成立，他们除了扣押船只外，还可能面临最高 20 年的监禁。除了对搜寻与援救船员和非政府组织提起刑事和行政诉讼外，南欧成员国还在寻找其他方法来阻碍地中海的搜寻与援救能力，例如通过港口国管制检查。然而，欧洲法院 2022 年 8 月的一项裁决明确表示，虽然船舶检查是必要的，但不能以任意理由扣留搜救非政府组织船只，包括船上被救人员“太多”或缺乏船旗国不存在的证书（Sea Watch，2022）长期以来，法律学者一直将这些针对移民背景下的活动人士和非政府组织的刑事定罪行为视为犯罪移民的一部分：一个明显的趋势。在过去 30 年中，描述了各国对移民犯罪实施的刑事制裁的激增。在这一理论框架内，该项目调查了自愿搜救检查行动的刑事定罪：1）源自欧盟协调员一揽子计划的法规、实践和法律。以及各国对此的解释，用于限制和/或将自愿海上救援定为犯罪； 2) 海事志愿者如何概念化其在海上救援中的作用和参与；以及， 3) 执行海上救援任务的志愿组织地中海地区受到越来越多的限制。