Impassioned Belief: Developing and Defending a New Form of Meta-Normative Expressivism

热情的信仰：发展和捍卫一种新形式的元规范表现主义

基本信息

批准号：
AH/I022965/1
负责人：
Michael Ridge
金额：
$ 10.44万
依托单位：
University of Edinburgh
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Fellowship
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2011 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FI022965%2F1
关键词：
Impassioned Belief Developing Defending New

项目摘要

Whenever one ponders what he or she ought to do, what would be rational to do, what he or she has most reason to do, what it would be good to do, or what he or she must do, where these questions are meant to settle the question of what he or she shall do, one is engaged in what philosophers call 'normative thought.' Such thoughts are ubiquitous in human life, and indeed are a fundamental aspect of human nature which distinguishes us from simpler creatures. A cat may in some loose or weak sense deliberate about what to do, but certainly is not capable of agonizing about the morality of tormenting its prey. On reflection normative thought is, though, as philosophically puzzling as it is familiar and ubiquitous. It is this juxtaposition of the familiar with the philosophically puzzling that makes reflection on the nature of normative thought and discourse so fascinating.Normative thought and discourse is puzzling in part because it seems rather Janus-faced. On the one hand, normative judgment is classified as true or false, figures in seemingly rational inferences, and is even thought to provide a possible object of knowledge. In all of these ways, normative judgments seem like ordinary beliefs. On the other hand, normative judgment can directly guide action, we doubt the sincerity of someone who says some form of behaviour is (e.g.) morally wrong but shows no compunction about engaging in that behaviour, and we tend to think that someone who really does believe they ought to do something but choose not to do it is irrational. In all of these ways, normative judgment seems more like desire, sentiment or intention rather than belief. Given powerful philosophical arguments that beliefs and desires are what David Hume famously called 'distinct existences', this Janus-faced aspect of moral judgment is deeply philosophically puzzling. For if beliefs are just inert representations of the facts, and nothing but the facts, then it is hard to see how normative judgment qua belief could be motivating in and of itself. If, however, normative judgments are just desires then it is hard to see how normative judgment could have the belief-like features which it manifestly does have.Traditional attempts to answer these thorny questions tend to emphasize sentiment to the exclusion of reason (e.g., in the work of David Hume and those inspired by his approach) or reason and cognition to the exclusion of sentiment (e.g. in the work of Plato and Kant and those inspired by their work). Since the dawn of the 20th century this long-standing debate has taken the form of a debate between self-styled 'expressivists' and 'cognitivists' in metaethics. Cognitivists try to show how beliefs can play the motivational role more naturally associated with desire, while expressivists try to model belief-like features with desires. Not surprisingly, these efforts can seem like attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It is here that my project offers the promise of breaking through this impasse at the heart of contemporary metaethics and meta-normative theory more generally. On my account, moral and other normative sentences express both beliefs and desires, and moral and other normative judgments are constituted by both beliefs and desires. This approach promises to synthesize the best of both the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions without the costs of either.In developing this theroy, I contrast it with other recent 'hybrid' theories in the literature and argue for its superiority. I also explore its implications for such issues as the context-sensitivity of reasons, the role of principles in moral thought and judgment, and the logical relationships between values and reasons. I also embed the theory in a broader semantic framework which avoids the rampant and implausible ambiguities posited by other semantic theories. Thisprovides a novel perspective on how specifically normative uses of terms like 'ought' are located.

每当一个人思考他或她应该做什么、做什么是合理的、他或她最有理由做什么、做什么是好的、或者他或她必须做什么时，这些问题的目的是当一个人解决他或她应该做什么的问题时，就会陷入哲学家所说的“规范性思维”。这些想法在人类生活中无处不在，而且确实是人性的一个基本方面，它将我们与简单的生物区分开来。猫可能会在某种松散或微弱的意义上考虑要做什么，但肯定没有能力为折磨猎物的道德而苦恼。然而，反思起来，规范思想在哲学上令人困惑，但它却是常见且普遍存在的。正是这种熟悉的事物与哲学上令人困惑的事物的并置，使得对规范思想和话语本质的反思如此令人着迷。规范思想和话语令人困惑的部分原因是它看起来相当两面性。一方面，规范判断被分类为真或假，表现为看似理性的推论，甚至被认为提供了可能的知识对象。从所有这些方面来看，规范判断似乎都是普通的信念。另一方面，规范判断可以直接指导行动，我们怀疑某人说某种形式的行为在道德上是错误的，但对从事这种行为却没有表现出内疚，我们怀疑他的诚意，并且我们倾向于认为真正这样做的人相信他们应该做某事但选择不做是不合理的。从所有这些方面来看，规范判断似乎更像是欲望、情感或意图，而不是信仰。鉴于信念和欲望是大卫·休谟著名的“独特存在”这一强有力的哲学论证，道德判断的两面性在哲学上是令人深感困惑的。因为如果信念只是事实的惰性表征，而且除了事实之外什么也没有，那么就很难看出作为信念的规范判断本身如何能够产生激励作用。然而，如果规范性判断只是欲望，那么就很难看出规范性判断如何具有它显然具有的类似信仰的特征。回答这些棘手问题的传统尝试往往强调情感而排除理性（例如，在大卫·休谟的作品中以及那些受他的方法启发的人中）或排除情感的理性和认知（例如在柏拉图和康德的作品中以及那些受他们的作品启发的人）。自20世纪初以来，这场旷日持久的争论表现为元伦理学中自称为“表现主义者”和“认知主义者”之间的争论。认知主义者试图展示信念如何能够更自然地发挥与欲望相关的激励作用，而表现主义者则试图用欲望来模拟类似信念的特征。毫不奇怪，这些努力看起来就像是试图在圆孔中安装方钉。正是在这里，我的项目有望打破当代元伦理学和更广泛的元规范理论核心的僵局。在我看来，道德和其他规范性句子表达了信念和欲望，而道德和其他规范性判断又是由信念和欲望构成的。这种方法有望综合感伤主义和理性主义传统的优点，而无需付出任何代价。在发展这一理论时，我将其与文献中其他最近的“混合”理论进行了对比，并论证了其优越性。我还探讨了它对诸如理由的情境敏感性、原则在道德思维和判断中的作用以及价值观和理由之间的逻辑关系等问题的影响。我还将该理论嵌入到更广泛的语义框架中，避免了其他语义理论所提出的猖獗且令人难以置信的歧义。这为如何定位“应该”等术语的具体规范使用提供了一个新颖的视角。