Real Option and Investment Decision

实物期权与投资决策

• 批准号: 23530450
• 负责人: KATSURAYAMA Yasunori
• 金额: $ 1.25万
• 依托单位: Waseda University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530450/
• 关键词: リアルオプション; 投資意思決定

In this research, the situation where there exists agency relationship between manager and investors is considered. Investors are contract with managers to run their company. Usually there are conflicts of interest called agency problem. One of the causes of the agency problem is a difference of the time horizon between two parties. It is modeled via the real option problem which enables us to deal with the flexibility of the management. For example the manager has an opportunity to reduce the size of investment by introducing a new technology which is costly. The effects of time horizon are analyzed.Empirical study around SEOs(Seasoned Equity Offering) are also analyzed. Especially the cumulative abnormal return around Japanese SEO and the effect of law reforms are reported.

本研究考虑了管理者与投资者之间存在代理关系的情况。投资者与经理签订合同来运营他们的公司。通常存在利益冲突，称为代理问题。代理问题的原因之一是双方时间跨度的差异。它是通过实物期权问题建模的，这使我们能够处理管理的灵活性。例如，管理者有机会通过引入成本高昂的新技术来减少投资规模。分析了时间跨度的影响。还分析了SEO（经验丰富的股权发行）的实证研究。特别是围绕日本SEO的累积异常回报和法律改革的效果进行了报道。

项目成果

SEOs return and Japanese Law Reforms.

SEO 回归和日本法律改革。

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: Yasunori Katsurayama;Keiji Abe
• 通讯作者: Keiji Abe

資本予算とリアルオプション

资本预算和实物期权

• 发表时间: 2013
• 期刊: 早稲田商学
• 作者: 葛山康典

SEO returns and Japanese Law Reforms

SEO 回归和日本法律改革

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: Yasunori Katsurayama;Keiji Abe
• 通讯作者: Keiji Abe