CAMO: Counterfeit Attestation MOdule for Electronics Supply Chain Tracking and Provenance

CAMO：用于电子供应链跟踪和来源的防伪认证模块

• 批准号: 2341895
• 负责人: Domenic Forte
• 金额: $ 45万
• 依托单位: University of Florida
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2024
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2024-05-15 至 2027-04-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2341895&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAMO; Counterfeit; Attestation; MOdule; Electronics

Supply chain globalization and e-commerce have caused a substantial rise in counterfeit electronics trafficking, which was only exacerbated by the pandemic-induced microchip shortage. When high-demand electronics are not available in the marketplace, they become prime targets for counterfeiters. Aside from billions of dollars lost from intellectual property (IP) infringement, counterfeit electronics are often of substandard quality, thereby creating risks for systems and infrastructure in critical sectors such as healthcare, food and agriculture, communications, transportation, energy, manufacturing, emergency services, defense, and more. Recent legislation, such as the CHIPS Act, stresses the need for procedures to combat counterfeiting, but key stakeholders have resisted adoption of the requisite technologies for years. Counterfeit detection and avoidance can be accomplished by physical inspection, electrical tests, or design-for-anti-counterfeit (DfAC). The former two have been the mainstay, but are less reliable, more expensive, and lack automation. Although DfAC primitives can only be included in brand new electronics, they are more promising with respect to accuracy, authentication cost, and scalability. Further, centralized and decentralized ledger technologies, including blockchains, are advancing to support DfAC primitive verification and for immutable traceability and provenance of electronics. This project aims to address the major barriers for DfAC primitive integration into microchips and systems. Counterfeit attestation modules (CAMOs for short) will be developed to efficiently collect DfAC outputs from all the microchips on a printed circuit board (PCB), verify that the PCB itself has not been tampered, and protect communication of results to a digital ledger for en masse authentication. In addition, lightweight DfAC primitives that can be conveniently incorporated into common microchip modules will also be explored. Scalable, convenient, and inexpensive detection of counterfeit electronics from this project shall result in savings for commercial and defense industries that will be passed on to consumers and taxpayers.The above goals will be achieved through four tasks. First, a novel circuit called Resonant Frequency Lock-On (Res-FLO) will be explored for self-contained authentication of PCBs. Res-FLO captures unique, process variation dependent signatures from PCB power distribution networks to detect cloned and tampered PCBs. Next, to support chip authentication and provide security in CAMO communication protocols, lightweight DfAC primitives will be investigated for detecting the two most prevalent counterfeit chip types – recycled and cloned. The former will be detected by measuring degradation in analog and digital low dropout regulators (LDOs) while the latter can be achieved by adopting physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Third, inexpensive protocols that provide confidentiality and integrity for communications within the PCB and to a ledger/blockchain will be composed from elements of the first two tasks. Namely, CAMO will exploit the large input/output space, machine learning (ML) attack resistance, and multiple measurements of strong PUFs to increase the security and confidence of authentic/counterfeit classification without the need for expensive cryptographic and error correction schemes. Finally, the CAMO primitives and protocols will be taped out for proof-of-concept and to capture overheads, impacts of aging and noise, resistance to attacks, etc.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

供应链全球化和电子商务已导致伪造电子贩运的大幅上升，这仅因大流行引起的微芯片短缺而加剧。当市场上没有高需求的电子产品时，它们就会成为造假者的主要目标。除了侵犯知识产权（IP）损失的数十亿美元外，假冒电子设备通常具有不合格的质量，从而在关键部门（例如医疗保健，食品和农业，交通，运输，能源，能源，能源，制造，制造，紧急服务，国防等）中为系统和基础设施造成了风险。最近的立法，例如《筹码法》，强调需要对伪造伪造的程序进行打击，但主要利益相关者多年来一直抵制采用必要技术。假冒的检测和避免可以通过物理检查，电气测试或Anti-Anti-Counterfeit（DFAC）来实现。前两个是中流台的，但不太可靠，更昂贵且缺乏自动化。尽管DFAC原语只能包含在全新的电子产品中，但在准确性，身份验证成本和可扩展性方面，它们更有承诺。此外，包括区块链在内的集中和分散的分类帐技术正在前进，以支持DFAC原始验证以及不变的可追溯性和电子产品的出处。该项目旨在解决DFAC原始整合到微芯片和系统中的主要障碍。将开发伪造的证明模块（CAMOS），以有效地从印刷电路板（PCB）上的所有微芯片收集DFAC输出，并验证PCB本身尚未篡改，并保护与数字账本的沟通来验证ensse aSSENASSECHICATION。此外，还将探索可以方便地合并到常见的微芯片模块中的轻型DFAC原语。可扩展，方便且廉价地发现该项目的假冒电子产品应为商业和国防行业节省储蓄，并将其传递给消费者和纳税人。以上目标将通过四个任务实现。首先，将探索一个名为“共振频率锁定”（RES-FLO）的新型电路，以用于PCB的自包含身份验证。 RES-FLO捕获来自PCB功率分布网络的独特，过程变化依赖性签名，以检测克隆和篡改PCB。接下来，为了支持CHIP身份验证并提供迷彩通信协议中的安全性，将研究轻巧的DFAC原始图，以检测两种最普遍的假冒芯片类型 - 再生和克隆。前者将通过测量模拟和数字低辍学器（LDOS）中的降解来检测到，而后者可以通过采用物理不可吻合的功能（PUF）来实现。第三，廉价的协议可以从前两个任务的元素组成PCB和分类帐/区块链内部和分类帐/区块链内的通信。也就是说，Camo将探索大型输入/输出空间，机器学习（ML）攻击性以及对强PUF的多次测量，以提高真实/假冒分类的安全性和信心，而无需昂贵的加密和错误校正计划。最后，迷彩的原语和协议将被录制以进行概念验证，并捕获间接费用，衰老和噪音的影响，对攻击的抵制等。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是通过基金会的知识分子和更广泛影响的评估来评估来获得的支持。