Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: ERADICATOR: Techniques for Laser Assisted Side-Channel Attack Monitor & Response

协作研究：SaTC：核心：小型：ERADICATOR：激光辅助侧信道攻击监控技术

• 批准号: 2150122
• 负责人: Domenic Forte
• 金额: $ 23.37万
• 依托单位: University of Florida
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-06-15 至 2025-05-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2150122&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; SaTC; CORE; Small

The security of modern electronic systems relies on secret keys and assets stored on secure integrated circuits (ICs). Extracting such information using side-channel attacks would break the security of the entire system. One class of side-channel attacks relies on known laser techniques from the field of IC failure analysis, which makes the contactless probing of on-chip data possible. These optical probing attacks are so powerful in extracting secrets from computer chips that conventional countermeasures are ineffective against them. It has been demonstrated that these attacks can be accomplished in a matter of days (from initial analysis of IC activity to full data extraction), even with limited knowledge of the chip under attack. This leaves some of our most critical commercial, industrial, and defense systems vulnerable to intellectual property piracy and sensitive data breaches. Hence, the threats of laser-assisted side-channel attacks warrant an effective response to protect assets stored in ICs. Unfortunately, few countermeasures have been proposed in the academic literature, and none are available commercially. Those that do exist are not only expensive but are incompatible with current IC manufacturing processes. This project investigates ERADICATOR, a multi-layer suite of sensors, randomization, and tamper response mechanisms, to avert laser-assisted side-channel attacks. The project's novelties are that ERADICATOR not only revisits traditional design philosophies to build comprehensive and unbreakable protection mechanisms but also draws upon solutions from multiple disciplines, such as physics, IC design, and cryptography. All layers of the countermeasures will be suitable for application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), but some will also apply to field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Moreover, this project explores the feasibility of having an open-source simulator for laser-assisted side-channel attacks that all researchers and practitioners can use to assess the security of their designs in the pre-silicon phase, and hence, choose the proper countermeasures. The project's broader significance and importance are the systematization of knowledge and exploration of novel laser attack countermeasures for electronic systems used in various applications, such as critical infrastructure, autonomous vehicles, aerospace, and defense equipment.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

现代电子系统的安全依赖于存储在安全集成电路（ICS）上的秘密密钥和资产。使用侧通道攻击提取此类信息将破坏整个系统的安全性。一类侧通道攻击依赖于IC失败分析领域的已知激光技术，这使得无接触式芯片数据的探测成为可能。这些光学探测攻击在从计算机芯片中提取秘密方面非常有力，以至于传统的对策对它们无效。已经证明，这些攻击可以在几天之内完成（从对IC活动的初始分析到完整数据提取），即使对芯片受到攻击的了解有限。这留下了我们一些最关键的商业，工业和防御系统，容易受到知识产权盗版和敏感数据泄露的影响。因此，激光辅助的侧通道攻击的威胁需要有效的回应，以保护IC中存储的资产。不幸的是，学术文献中很少有人提出对策，并且商业上没有任何对策。确实存在的不仅昂贵，而且与当前的IC制造过程不相容。该项目调查了Eradicator，这是一套多层传感器，随机化和篡改响应机制，以避免激光辅助侧向通道攻击。该项目的新颖性是消除器不仅重新审视了传统的设计理念，以建立全面且坚不可摧的保护机制，而且还利用了来自多个学科的解决方案，例如物理，IC设计和密码学。所有对策的所有层都适用于特定于应用的集成电路（ASIC），但有些也适用于现场可编程门阵列（FPGA）。此外，该项目探讨了为激光辅助侧渠道攻击提供开源模拟器的可行性，所有研究人员和从业人员都可以用来评估其在Silicon阶段的设计安全性，因此选择适当的对策。该项目的更广泛的意义和重要性是对用于各种应用中使用的电子系统的知识和探索的系统化，例如关键基础设施，自动驾驶汽车，航空航天和国防设备。这奖反映了NSF的法定任务，并通过使用基础的智能效果和广泛的范围来评估，并被视为值得通过评估来进行评估。

项目成果

Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical Attacks: Design Challenges and Opportunities

• DOI: 10.1145/3560828.3564010
• 发表时间: 2022-11
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense
• 作者: D. Koblah;F. Ganji;Domenic Forte;Shahin Tajik

A Twofold Clock and Voltage-Based Detection Method for Laser Logic State Imaging Attack

• DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2022.3214724
• 发表时间: 2023-01-01
• 期刊: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VERY LARGE SCALE INTEGRATION (VLSI) SYSTEMS
• 影响因子: 2.8
• 作者: Farheen，Tasnuva;Roy，Sourav;Forte，Domenic
• 通讯作者: Forte，Domenic

Protection Against Physical Attacks Through Self-Destructive Polymorphic Latch

通过自毁式多态锁存器防御物理攻击

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD
• 作者: Cannon, A.;Farheen, T.;Roy, S;Tajik, S.;Forte, D.
• 通讯作者: Forte, D.

Polymorphic Sensor to Detect Laser Logic State Imaging Attack

用于检测激光逻辑状态成像攻击的多态传感器

• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design
• 作者: Roy, Sourav;Tajik, Shahin;Forte, Domenic
• 通讯作者: Forte, Domenic