CPS: Synergy: Securing the Timing of Cyber-Physical Systems

CPS：协同：确保网络物理系统的时序

• 批准号: 1839511
• 负责人: Qi Zhu
• 金额: $ 65.98万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-02-01 至 2021-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1839511&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CPS; Synergy; Securing; Timing; Cyber; CPS; Synergy; Securing; Timing; Cyber

This project addresses timing attacks in cyber-physical systems, where attackers attempt to compromise the system functionality by changing the timing of computation and communication operations. Timing attacks could be particularly destructive for cyber-physical systems because the correctness of system functionality is affected not only by the data values of operations but also significantly by at what time operations are conducted. The discoveries and methodologies developed in this project will provide fundamental advances in addressing timing attacks, and lead to the design and implementation of more secure cyber-physical systems in a number of key sectors, including automotive and transportation systems, industrial automation, and robotics. In addition to disseminate the research results through publications and workshops, the PIs will collaborate with industry partners on transitioning the research findings into practice. The PIs will also integrate the research into the curriculum at UCR and leverage it for K-12 education through the use of Lego Mindstorm platforms.The project will build a framework for identifying, analyzing and protecting cyber-physical systems against timing attacks. Building the framework consists of three closely-related research thrusts: 1) Investigate potential timing-based attack surface, and further analyze what types and patterns of timing variations the attacks may cause and how attackers may try to hide the traces of such attacks. 2) Based on the identified attack surface and strategies, analyze how timing changes caused by these attacks may affect the overall system properties, in particular safety, stability and performance. 3) Develop control-based and cyber-security defense strategies against timing attacks. This includes run-time security detectors and mitigation/adaptation strategies across control layer and embedded system layer, as well as design-time mechanisms to provide systems that are resilient to timing attacks. This project will focus on vehicle networks and multi-agent robotic systems as main application domains.

该项目解决了网络物理系统中的时序攻击，攻击者试图通过更改计算和通信操作的时间来损害系统功能。时间攻击可能对网络物理系统尤其具有破坏性，因为系统功能的正确性不仅受操作数据值的影响，而且还会在什么时间进行操作。该项目中开发的发现和方法将在解决时间攻击方面提供基本进展，并导致在许多关键部门（包括汽车和运输系统，工业自动化和机器人技术）中设计和实施更安全的网络物理系统。除了通过出版和研讨会传播研究结果外，PI还将与行业合作伙伴合作，将研究结果转移到实践中。 PI还将通过使用Lego Mindstorm平台将研究纳入UCR的课程中，并利用K-12教育。该项目将建立一个框架，用于识别，分析和保护网络物理系统，以防止时间攻击。构建该框架由三个密切相关的研究推力组成：1）研究基于计时的攻击表面，并进一步分析攻击可能导致的定时变化类型和模式，以及攻击者如何试图隐藏此类攻击的痕迹。 2）基于确定的攻击表面和策略，分析这些攻击引起的时序变化如何影响整体系统属性，特别是安全，稳定性和性能。 3）制定基于控制的和网络安全防御策略，以防止时间攻击。这包括运行时安全探测器以及跨控制层和嵌入式系统层的缓解/适应策略，以及设计时间机制，以提供对定时攻击有弹性的系统。该项目将集中于车辆网络和多代理机器人系统作为主要应用程序域。