TWC SBE: Medium: Collaborative: Brain Hacking: Assessing Psychological and Computational Vulnerabilities in Brain-based Biometrics

TWC SBE：媒介：协作：大脑黑客：评估基于大脑的生物识别技术中的心理和计算漏洞

• 批准号: 1564046
• 负责人: Zhanpeng Jin
• 金额: $ 90万
• 依托单位: SUNY at Binghamton
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-08-15 至 2018-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1564046&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; SBE; Medium; Collaborative; Brain

In September of 2015, it was reported that hackers had stolen the fingerprint records of 5.6 million U.S. federal employees from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This was a severe security breach, and it is an even bigger problem because those fingerprints are now permanently compromised and the users cannot generate new fingerprints. This breach demonstrates two challenging facts about the current cybersecurity landscape. First, biometric credentials are vulnerable to compromise. And, second, biometrics that cannot be replaced if stolen are even more vulnerable to theft. This research will investigate a new type of biometric that avoids both of these problems. In particular, the research will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of brain biometrics. Brain biometrics are more difficult to steal than fingerprints, since current technology for collecting brain biometrics is impossible to use without a person's knowledge and consent. Brain biometrics, importantly, can also be cancelled if stolen. This is because there are vast networks of the brain that generate unique activity, meaning that if a person's brainprint is stolen, they can generate a new one by tapping in to a different brain network. This investigation holds the potential to transform existing authentication systems into more secure and attack-resistant brain biometric solutions; critical for high-security applications.Brain biometrics have recently been shown to be 100% accurate in identifying people, in a pool of 50 users and across a period of up to a year. This research project will systematically evaluate the potential vulnerabilities of brainprint biometrics, with the goals of 1) demonstrating the resistance and robustness of brainprints to the most likely attacks and 2) developing a comprehensive protection plan addressed at the most vulnerable aspects of this method. In particular, the interdisciplinary team plans to investigate psychological and computational attacks. Psychological attacks consist of attempting to force a user to provide their brainprints under duress, or attempting to impersonate a target brainprint through biofeedback entrainment process. Computational attacks consist of attempting to circumvent brainprint authentication system through presenting a counterfeit or stolen brainprint, with varying levels of obfuscation, such as the addition of noise, and attacking the stimuli database. This project will examine potential vulnerabilities in brain biometrics at an unprecedented level of detail, and convert the resulting knowledge into recommendations for implementation of brain biometrics to guard an increasingly vulnerable cyberspace.

据报道，2015年9月，黑客从人事管理办公室（OPM）偷走了560万美国联邦雇员的指纹记录。这是严重的安全漏洞，这是一个更大的问题，因为这些指纹现在已被永久妥协，用户无法生成新的指纹。这种违规表明了有关当前网络安全局势的两个具有挑战性的事实。首先，生物识别凭证容易受到妥协的影响。其次，如果被盗更容易盗窃，就无法替代生物识别技术。这项研究将研究一种避免这两个问题的新型生物识别。特别是，该研究将评估脑生物识别技术的优势和劣势。大脑生物识别技术比指纹更难窃取，因为如果没有人的知识和同意，目前无法使用用于收集脑生物识别技术的技术。重要的是，如果被盗，也可以取消脑生物识别技术。这是因为大脑的庞大网络会产生独特的活动，这意味着，如果一个人的脑印刷被盗，它们可以通过利用其他大脑网络来产生新的活动。这项调查具有将现有身份验证系统转变为更安全和耐攻击的大脑生物识别解决方案的潜力。对于高安全性应用程序至关重要。脑生物识别技术最近已被证明在识别人，50个用户以及最多一年期间的人中是100％准确的。该研究项目将系统地评估脑形生物识别技术的潜在脆弱性，其目标是1）证明脑印对最有可能攻击的耐药性和鲁棒性，以及2）制定该方法最脆弱的方面解决的全面保护计划。特别是，跨学科团队计划调查心理和计算攻击。心理攻击包括试图迫使用户在胁迫下提供脑印，或试图通过生物反馈夹带过程来模仿目标脑印。计算攻击包括试图通过呈现伪造或被盗的脑打印来规避脑打印身份验证系统，并具有不同水平的混淆水平，例如添加噪声和攻击刺激数据库。该项目将以前所未有的细节级别检查脑生物识别技术中的潜在脆弱性，并将所得的知识转换为实施脑生物识别技术的建议，以保护日益脆弱的网络空间。