Regulating the Selection of Products under Investment Accounts Pension System: A Study of the Chilean Experience

规范投资账户养老金制度产品选择：智利经验研究

• 批准号: 0922405
• 负责人: Petra Todd
• 金额: $ 23.05万
• 依托单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0922405&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Regulating; Selection; Products; under; Investment

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).Many pay-as-you-go social security systems in the United States and Europe face impeding insolvency as the number of pensioners per worker rises. Among the possible reforms being considered is transiting to fully funded privatized accounts system. Chile was the first country to switch from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded private retirement accounts system in 1980. Chile's pension system has served as a prototype for pension reform in many Latin American countries, most recently in Mexico. U.S. and European policy makers are also looking with keen interest at the Chilean experience. This project investigates the choice of product and subsequent pricing in an oligopolistic pension investment industry under regulatory constraints on fund performance. Specifically, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of consumer pension fund choices and of firm product and pricing choices. The pension investment industry exposes consumers to market risk. The government plays the role of a guarantor of last resort, supplementing pension accumulations that are insufficient either due to low income or unfavorable returns. Risky pension investments can therefore lead to a high level of government obligations. Additionally, the government guarantee may induce risk seeking behavior in low income individuals, and a competitive industry would likely over risky investment portfolios to meet this demand. The selection of investment products that firms offer to the market is therefore an important factor in the overall success of a privatized pension system. The Chilean government addresses this problem by regulating returns in a way that shifts the risk from consumers to money managers. We use our estimated model of decision-making by consumers and by pension fund companies (i) to investigate the effectiveness of the existing Chilean regulation in limiting risk in the system, (ii) to compare the current system to alternative forms of regulation, (iii) to investigate the socially optimal choice of pension products and (iv) to explore the effects of competition on the investment products offered on fee structures. Our focus is on Chile, but the results of this study should be of a more general interest. Pension reform proposals in the US and in Europe assume that the government supplements pension income in the case of insufficient accumulations. Therefore, these countries may face similar concerns about the selection of investment portfolios available to consumers through the pension system.Broader Impacts: The proposed research agenda will enhance the understanding of product choice and pricing decisions in the markets with differentiated products. It will also inform on the effects of alternative kinds of regulatory restrictions on firm decisions and on consumer welfare. For example, regulation that was designed to limit risk in the pension market can actually have the unintended consequences of increasing risk-taking by firms. The modeling framework proposed can also be extended to investigate the impact of the moral hazard on product selection as well as non-linear pricing in the market without adverse selection. This research fosters the understanding of the complex issues involved in design and operation of a fully funded pension system. It also contributes to the assessment of the viability of fully funded systems as a possible alternative to pay-as you go system currently in place. In addition, the project has broader impacts on teaching and training. Graduate students will participate in the data analysis. The results from this research will be widely disseminated through seminars, conferences and publications and the authors expect to include results from this research in their undergraduate and graduate course material.

该奖项是根据2009年的《美国复苏与再投资法》（公法111-5）进行的。美国和欧洲的许多付费社会保障系统面临妨碍的破产，因为每个工人的养老金领取者人数都会增加。在考虑的可能的改革中，是转变为完全资助的私有化帐户系统。智利是第一个从1980年从付费制度转变为资助的私人退休帐户系统的国家。美国和欧洲政策制定者也对智利经验充满兴趣。 该项目调查了在基金绩效的监管限制下，在寡头寄养投资行业中选择产品和随后的定价。具体而言，我们开发并估算了消费者养老基金选择以及公司产品和定价选择的均衡模型。养老金投资行业使消费者面临市场风险。政府扮演了最后一个度假胜地的担保人的角色，补充了由于低收入或不利的回报而不足的养老金积累。因此，冒险的养老金投资可以导致高水平的政府义务。此外，政府担保可能会引起低收入人士的风险寻求行为，竞争行业可能会过度冒险投资组合以满足这一需求。因此，企业向市场提供的投资产品的选择是私有养老金系统总体成功的重要因素。智利政府通过以将风险从消费者转移到货币管理者的方式来调节回报来解决这一问题。我们使用消费者和养老基金公司（i）的估算的决策模型（i）来研究现有法规在系统中限制风险中的有效性，（ii）将当前系统与替代制度的法规形式进行比较，（iii）研究养老金产品和（iv）的社会最佳选择，以探索对收费产品的竞争对竞争的影响。我们的重点是智利，但是这项研究的结果应该具有更普遍的兴趣。在美国和欧洲的养老金改革建议假设，如果积累不足，政府可以补充养老金收入。因此，这些国家可能会对消费者通过养老金系统选择为消费者提供的投资组合的选择面临类似的担忧。Broader的影响：拟议的研究议程将增强对产品选择和使用差异化产品的产品选择和定价决策的理解。它还将告知替代类型的监管限制对公司决策和消费者福利的影响。 例如，旨在限制养老金市场风险的法规实际上可能会带来增加公司风险增加的意外后果。还可以扩展提出的建模框架，以研究道德危害对产品选择的影响以及在市场中非线性定价而没有不利选择的影响。 这项研究促进了对完全资助的养老金系统设计和运营所涉及的复杂问题的理解。它还有助于评估全额资助的系统的可行性，这是您当前使用系统的付款的一种替代方法。此外，该项目对教学和培训有更大的影响。研究生将参加数据分析。这项研究的结果将通过研讨会，会议和出版物广泛传播，作者期望将这项研究的结果包括在其本科和研究生课程材料中。