ICES: Small: Collaborative Research:Understanding the Roles of Intermediaries in Matching Markets

ICES：小型：协作研究：了解中介机构在匹配市场中的作用

• 批准号: 1216095
• 负责人: Jason Hartline
• 金额: $ 27.35万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-09-01 至 2016-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1216095&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ICES; Small; Collaborative; Research; Understanding

Market design--economic engineering--has been successful in the redesign of real-world "two-sided matching markets," including the matching of doctors to residencies and the assignment of students to schools. A recent and growing literature has shown that the methods and results of two-sided matching theory extend to substantially more general settings, including "trading networks" in which agents negotiate over contracts.Unlike two-sided matching markets, trading networks feature intermediaries, agents who both buy and sell in the market. These intermediaries may be intermediate producers (as in most economic models of supply chains) or may simply facilitate trade (e.g., through provision of information). Although the presence of intermediaries is the defining distinction between the matching-in-networks model and the previous two-sided frameworks, the analysis of intermediaries in these matching models has been limited.This research will further our understanding of the behavior and impact of market intermediaries. Theoretical work using the matching-in-networks framework will be supplemented with detailed empirical analyses using plant-level microdata on production networks, in order to gain insight into the magnitudes of intermediaries' effects on welfare. Simulated counterfactual models will be developed when theory does not provide sharp predictions.This work will inform and support new applications of market design approaches to real-world intermediated matching markets. One focus will be understanding how "local" perturbations (e.g., intermediary entrance and exit) affect the "global" structure of networks; another will be the identification and reduction of rent seeking by intermediaries.In addition to enabling novel work in applied market design, this research will promote joint work between computer scientists and economists working in the theory and practice of market design.

市场设计——经济工程——已经成功地重新设计了现实世界的“双向匹配市场”，包括医生与住院医师的匹配以及学生到学校的分配。最近越来越多的文献表明，双边匹配理论的方法和结果可以扩展到更一般的环境，包括代理人通过合同进行谈判的“交易网络”。与双边匹配市场不同，交易网络以中介机构、代理人为特征。他们在市场上买卖。这些中介机构可能是中间生产者（如大多数供应链经济模型中那样），也可能只是促进贸易（例如，通过提供信息）。尽管中介机构的存在是网络匹配模型与之前的双边框架之间的决定性区别，但这些匹配模型中对中介机构的分析仍然有限。这项研究将进一步加深我们对市场行为和影响的理解。中介机构。使用网络匹配框架的理论工作将得到使用生产网络工厂级微观数据的详细实证分析的补充，以便深入了解中介机构对福利的影响程度。当理论不能提供准确的预测时，将开发模拟的反事实模型。这项工作将为市场设计方法在现实世界中介匹配市场中的新应用提供信息和支持。重点之一是理解“局部”扰动（例如，中间入口和出口）如何影响网络的“全局”结构；另一个是识别和减少中介机构的寻租行为。除了在应用市场设计中开展新颖的工作之外，这项研究还将促进计算机科学家和经济学家在市场设计理论和实践方面的联合工作。