NECO: Provably Assurable Ad Hoc Networks under Arbitrary Malicious Behaviors

NECO：任意恶意行为下可证明可保证的 Ad Hoc 网络

• 批准号: 0831999
• 负责人: Xiaojun Lin
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: Purdue University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-09-01 至 2013-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0831999&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NECO; Provably; Assurable; Ad; Hoc

Ad hoc wireless networks are becoming important in several application domains. In these networks, nodes cooperate among themselves to achieve collective tasks, without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure. However, the cooperative nature and the possible hostile environments where the networks may be deployed make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. Some of these attacks can be addressed through customized cryptographic primitives. However, the adversary can physically compromise the network nodes, and thus defeat the cryptographic measures. Further, the adversary may have much higher computational and communication capabilities than the legitimate nodes, and the malicious nodes can collude among themselves. This has created a difficult imbalance in securing ad hoc networks---defense is hard and resource-consuming while attack is often easy.In this project, the PIs at Purdue University are developing a provably-assurable ad hoc network protocol suite to invert this imbalance. The system developed can give guaranteed security properties under a wide, and rigorously quantifiable, range of adversarial behaviors, including Byzantine behaviors. The project employs two main thrusts: (i) Security by diversification and randomization; and (ii) Security through accountability and reputation. The solution is applied to secure routing, secure data aggregation, and distributed leader selection.Broader Impact: The project will significantly advance our understanding of the fundamental limits for security in wireless ad hoc networks. It will provide methods to design provably-secure wireless protocols for a large class of mission-critical applications. The results will be disseminated through public release of detailed design documents, software, and graduate course materials.

临时无线网络在几个应用程序域变得重要。在这些网络中，节点彼此合作以实现集体任务，而无需任何先前存在的基础架构。但是，可以部署网络的合作性质和可能的敌对环境，使它们容易受到广泛的安全攻击。 这些攻击中的一些可以通过自定义的加密原语来解决。但是，对手可以物理损害网络节点，从而破坏密码措施。此外，对手可能比合法节点具有更高的计算能力和通信能力，而恶意节点可以互相勾结。这在确保临时网络方面造成了困难 - 国防是艰苦而耗时的，而攻击通常很容易。在这个项目中，普渡大学的PIS正在开发可证明可证明的临时网络协议套件，以颠倒这种不平衡。开发的系统可以在广泛，严格量化的对抗性行为（包括拜占庭行为）下提供保证的安全性。该项目采用了两个主要推力：（i）通过多元化和随机分配安全性； （ii）通过问责制和声誉安全。该解决方案用于保护路由，安全数据聚合和分布式领导者选择。Broader的影响：该项目将大大提高我们对无线临时网络安全性基本限制的理解。它将提供针对大量关键任务应用程序设计可证明的无线协议的方法。结果将通过公开发布详细的设计文档，软件和研究生课程材料来传播。