Doctoral Dissertation: A Sociological Analysis of Generalized Information Exchange

博士论文：广义信息交换的社会学分析

• 批准号: 0402614
• 负责人: Karen Cook
• 金额: $ 0.73万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0402614&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Sociological; Analysis; Generalized

The goal of this dissertation research is to understand how generalized information systems emerge and persist when information, as the object of exchange, produces a collective good. In this type of generalized exchange, individuals contribute to a collective good (pool of information), and the rewards that an actor receives come from this collective good. Because it is rational to free ride by receiving rewards from the public pool of information while not contributing to it, understanding how generalized information exchange emerges and persists requires individuals to overcome a social dilemma. I develop a theoretical argument that specifies how social psychological processes act as selective incentives that increase individual contributions to a public pool of information. In particular, when the costs associated with contributing information are small, social psychological factors such as the popularity of one's own information and the normative obligation associated with observing cooperative behavior can have a relatively profound effect on cooperation. The data for this research will be collected at the Stanford University Laboratory for Social Research in the Department of Sociology. Approximately 150 experimental subjects will participate in one of five experimental conditions that use a computerized exchange program that was developed specifically for this research. The broader impacts of this research include the following: In a world where the instantaneous transfer of information is crucial to world business, education, economics, and politics, understanding how information exchange systems can emerge and persist is a central problem for our increasingly interconnected societies. The results of this study have broader implications for both generalized exchange theory and real world generalized information exchange systems. This dissertation extends theory and findings on generalized exchange, collective action, and social dilemmas by focusing on information as the object of exchange and the role of social psychological selective incentives in generalized exchange systems. Additionally, this research can help us to understand the underlying processes that lead to the emergence of real-world generalized information exchanges such as those found in peer-to-peer networks on the Internet.

本论文研究的目的是了解当信息作为交换对象产生集体利益时，广义信息系统是如何出现和持续的。 在这种类型的广义交换中，个人为集体利益（信息池）做出贡献，而参与者获得的奖励则来自该集体利益。 因为通过从公共信息池中获得奖励而不对其做出贡献来搭便车是理性的，所以理解广义信息交换如何出现和持续需要个人克服社会困境。 我提出了一个理论论证，详细说明了社会心理过程如何作为选择性激励措施，增加个人对公共信息库的贡献。 特别是，当与提供信息相关的成本较小时，社会心理因素（例如自己信息的受欢迎程度和与观察合作行为相关的规范义务）可能对合作产生相对深远的影响。 这项研究的数据将在斯坦福大学社会学系社会研究实验室收集。 大约 150 名实验对象将参加五种实验条件之一，这些实验条件使用专门为本研究开发的计算机化交换程序。这项研究的更广泛影响包括以下内容： 在信息即时传输对于世界商业、教育、经济和政治至关重要的世界中，了解信息交换系统如何出现和持续是我们日益相互联系的社会的一个中心问题。 这项研究的结果对广义交换理论和现实世界的广义信息交换系统都有更广泛的影响。 本论文通过关注作为交换对象的信息以及社会心理选择性激励在广义交换系统中的作用，扩展了广义交换、集体行动和社会困境的理论和发现。此外，这项研究可以帮助我们了解导致现实世界通用信息交换出现的基本过程，例如互联网上的点对点网络中的信息交换。