Natural Sample Spaces and Judgment Under Uncertainty

自然样本空间与不确定性下的判断

• 批准号: 9221779
• 负责人: Russell Fazio
• 金额: $ 9.46万
• 依托单位: Indiana University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1993
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1993-02-01 至 1995-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9221779&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Natural; Sample; Spaces; Judgment; Under

ABSTRACT Judging the probability of uncertain events is essential for effective decision making. Yet people make many systemic errors in their intuitive judgments. These errors impede important decisions that people make on a daily basis, such as medical diagnosis, political and legal policy-making, and planning for the future. The specific aims of the research are to evaluate and explore the implications of a conceptual framework developed by Gavanski and Hui (1992) for understanding the mental processes that underlie judgements of probability. Gavanski and Hui have argued that, contrary to previous theories, people are not necessarily bad statisticians, in that their judgment strategies are not fundamentally incompatible with statistical principles. However, they are sometimes bad samplers, in that they may access inappropriate sets of information from memory for making their judgments. Both accurate and inaccurate judgments can be understood according to what sets of information people access. This research will (a) test some basic assumptions underlying the framework, (b) apply the framework to understanding the processes by which cognitive organization (i.e., the categorization of information in memory) influence people's ability to judge various probabilities, (c) evaluate novel predictions of the framework for conditions under which people will make either accurate or inaccurate judgments, and (d) use the framework to account for and clarify the processes underlying some established judgment phenomena. The long term objective of the research is to provide an understanding of how people judge probability and when and why they make judgment errors. In addition, the research will lead to the identification of tasks particularly likely to evoke judgment errors and to the development of techniques for improving people's judgments and decisions.

摘要判断不确定事件的可能性对于有效决策至关重要。 然而，人们在直观的判断中犯了许多系统错误。 这些错误阻碍了人们每天做出的重要决定，例如医学诊断，政治和法律决策以及对未来的计划。 这项研究的具体目的是评估和探索Gavanski和Hui（1992）开发的概念框架的含义，以理解概率判断的基础的心理过程。 Gavanski和Hui认为，与以前的理论相反，人们不一定是坏统计学家，因为他们的判断策略在根本上与统计原则根本不相容。 但是，它们有时是不良的采样器，因为它们可能会从内存中访问不适当的信息集来做出判断。 准确和不正确的判断都可以根据人们访问的信息集理解。 这项研究将（a）测试框架基础的一些基本假设，（b）将框架应用于理解认知组织（即记忆中信息分类）的过程（即，记忆中信息分类）会影响人们判断各种概率的能力，（c）评估对某些条件的框架的新颖预测，因为该框架对某些框架进行了审判，并在某些情况下判断了某些框架，并在其范围内进行判断，并（d）构成了框架和（d）的框架，并（d）确定框架和（d）的框架（d），并（d）判断了（d）的框架和（d）的框架（d），并（c）评估框架的范围和（d）的范围（d）。现象。 该研究的长期目标是提供对人们如何判断概率以及何时以及为什么判断判断错误的理解。此外，这项研究将导致识别特别有可能引起判断错误的任务，并开发改善人们的判断和决定的技术。