竞争与制度交互下的公司金融契约治理：行为分析与实验检验

The essence of corporate governance is to regulate the moral hazard behavior in the interaction between investors and entrepreneurs through a series of institutional arrangements. However, there are large differences on the effect of these different institutional arrangements. This research programme is supported by the model of three-period corporate financial contract. On the behavioral and experimental approach and in accordance with the principles of “from inside to outside” and “from weak to strong”, this research programme will design five key institutional mechanisms: preference mechanism, reputation mechanism, information sharing mechanism, lateral supervision mechanism and third party enforcement mechanism. We will build the corporate financial contract models under the five institutional mechanisms and solve the corresponding equilibrium solutions and their critical values. This research programme will measure the governance effect of these five mechanisms on mitigating the entrepreneurs’ moral hazard and protecting investors’ interests, and raising investment ratio by using the method of experimental economics. At the same time, this research programme will locate the model of three-period corporate financial contract in three different markets to investigate the interaction between competition structure and mechanisms: symmetric market, buyer competing market and seller competing market. This research programme will analyze the strengthening and weakening effect of different competitive situations on the institutional constraints and different behaviors of the core stakeholders in these situations. This research programme provides reference for perfecting the security mechanism of investors’ rights and interests in the transition economy and gives advices for the arrangement of these five mechanisms in different competition structure.

公司治理是通过一系列的制度安排来规制投资者和企业家交互行为中的道德风险，而不同的制度安排产生的作用存在较大差异。本项目依托于公司金融契约三阶段模型，沿着行为分析的进路，运用实验经济学的方法，按照从内到外和从弱到强的原则设计出偏好治理机制、声誉治理机制、信息共享机制、横向监督机制和第三方执行机制五种关键的制度安排，构建起五种制度下的公司金融契约模型并求解相应的均衡解和临界值。实验测度五种制度安排在缓解企业家道德风险行为以及保护投资者利益并提高投资比率中的作用。同时把公司金融契约三阶段模型放置于对称市场、买方竞争市场和卖方竞争市场三种不同的竞争环境中，测度市场竞争和制度约束交互下的契约治理效率，通过对比分析不同竞争态势对制度约束的强化和削弱作用以及当事人行为差异。本研究为完善转轨经济环境中的投资者权益保障机制设计提供参考，也为不同竞争框架中的制度安排如何搭配提供依据。

股份制企业的产生为生产规模的扩大提供了基础，而支撑这种生产组织的是募集资金问题。投资者拥有闲置资金却无经营能力，企业家具备经营能力却无足够的资金，二者的结合促生了现代企业经营模式，同时也引致了公司治理问题。公司治理是通过一系列的制度安排来规制投资者和企业家交互行为中的道德风险，在二者的交互行为中，由内到外地形成了偏好治理机制、声誉治理机制、信息共享机制、横向监督机制以及第三方执行机制五种关键的制度安排。这些制度安排通常是共同发挥作用的，使我们无法清楚地认识每一种制度安排及其发挥作用的程度。.本项目依托于公司金融契约三阶段模型，沿着行为分析的进路，运用实验经济学的方法，分别考察五种制度安排在缓解企业家项目选择和收益分配中的道德风险行为以及保护投资者利益并提高投资比率中的治理作用，同时把契约模型放置于对称市场、买方竞争市场和卖方竞争市场三种不同的竞争环境中，测度了市场竞争和制度约束交互下的契约治理效率，通过对比分析了不同竞争态势对制度约束的强化和削弱作用以及当事人行为差异。.研究发现：对称市场中第三方执行机制在签约和收益分配中的治理效率最高，横向监督机制在项目选择中的治理效率最高，风险偏好型投资者选择投资的比例高于风险规避型投资者，风险偏好型企业家选择高风险项目较多，市场整体收益在横向监督机制下最高，偏好治理机制下最低。买方竞争市场中五种制度约束所发挥的治理作用都有所提高，并且市场交易总体绩效也得到提升，但因买方竞争设置弱化了企业家的谈判权利，交易产生的剩余大部分被投资者占有。卖方竞争市场中五种制度安排都得到了不同程度的弱化，市场整体治理效率较低，签约比率降低，违约比率提升，市场总体绩效降低，卖方竞争弱化了投资者的谈判权利，交易产生的剩余大部分被企业家占有。.本研究为完善转轨经济环境中的投资者权益保障机制设计提供参考，也为不同竞争框架中的制度安排如何搭配提供依据。

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