Protocol Security Analysis for Discrete Modulated Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution

离散调制连续可变量子密钥分发的协议安全分析

• 批准号: 522308-2017
• 负责人: Lutkenhaus, Norbert
• 金额: $ 5.56万
• 依托单位: University of Waterloo
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Collaborative Research and Development Grants
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2020-01-01 至 2021-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=697514
• 关键词: Protocol; Security; Analysis; Discrete; Modulated

The emergence of quantum computers forces us to change the cryptographic infrastructure securing our data storage and communication structures. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) will be part of this new infrastructure as it can provide implementation security independent of future technological and algorithmic advances. Much conceptional and practical effort has to be made to make QKD compatible with modern optical communication technology to allow adoption of this technology within the broader telecom service provider market. QKD could be used to secure the telecommunication infrastructure or also to provide key management service to end customers. The requirement for the successful adoption will be stable equipment that fits seamless to existing infrastructure and use essentially the same components as the modern classical communication equipment. Over the recent years, immense progress has been made in our ability to analyze the security and performance of quantum key distribution protocols and their optical implementation. Initially the focus was on QKD technology that requires technology able to detect single photons, the smallest amount of light detectable. More recently, QKD systems based on modern homodyne and heterodyne detection technology were developed which use standard optical detection schemes as they are used in modern optical communication. No single-photon detection is required for these protocols, opening potentially the path for cheaper and faster QKD schemes. However, while some idealized situations of these protocols can now be readily analyzed, some desirable protocols, so called discrete-modulated continuous variable protocols, have resisted yet a full security analysis due to missing security proof techniques. In this proposal we will be developing new tools and methods for security proofs that are applicable to these desirable protocols. Only with clear formulated security proofs will we be able to deploy the new schemes to secure our infrastructure.

量子计算机的出现迫使我们更改密码基础架构，以确保我们的数据存储和通信结构。量子密钥分布（QKD）将成为这一新基础架构的一部分，因为它可以提供独立于未来的技术和算法进步的实施安全性。必须做出许多概念性和实用的努力来使QKD与现代光学通信技术兼容，以便在更广泛的电信服务提供商市场中采用该技术。 QKD可用于确保电信基础架构或为最终客户提供关键管理服务。成功采用的需求将是稳定的设备，该设备与现有基础设施无缝无缝，并使用与现代古典通信设备相同的组件。 近年来，我们在分析量子关键分布协议的安全性和性能及其光学实现的能力方面取得了巨大进展。最初，重点是QKD技术，该技术需要技术能够检测单个光子，这是最小的可检测到的光子。最近，开发了基于现代同源和杂词检测技术的QKD系统，这些系统使用标准的光学检测方案，因为它们在现代光学通信中使用。这些协议不需要单光子检测，这可能是更便宜，更快的QKD方案的路径。但是，尽管现在可以轻松地分析这些协议的一些理想化情况，但由于缺少安全性证明技术，因此某些理想的协议（所谓的离散调制的连续变量协议）却拒绝了完全的安全分析。在此提案中，我们将开发新的工具和方法，以提供适用于这些理想协议的安全性证明。只有有明确的安全证明，我们才能部署新计划以确保基础架构。