Competition, collaboration, and control of decision rights in supply chains

供应链中的竞争、协作和决策权控制

• 批准号: 262670-2011
• 负责人: Krishnan, Harish
• 金额: $ 1.53万
• 依托单位: University of British Columbia
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2015-01-01 至 2016-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=571278
• 关键词: Competition; collaboration; control; decision; rights

The management, coordination, and design of multi-firm supply chains are topics of interest to industrial engineers, operations and supply chain managers, and economists. Traditionally, research in this area has focused on the optimal control of operational decisions such as the management of inventories in a supply chain. The methodology used has relied heavily on optimization theory. In the last decade new research has augmented this literature by incorporating the issue of incentives. This additional focus is supported by game theory, and recognizes the fact that all supply chains consist of multiple independent decision makers and individual decision makers maximize their self-interest. Both approaches are important to help identify and eliminate supply chain inefficiencies but each implicitly assumes that the structure of the supply chain is predetermined; either a centralized decision maker exists, or multiple decision makers exist. In addition, the models assume that the control of supply chain decisions is predetermined. For example, in a typical supply chain model, a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer and the retailer makes the inventory decision while the manufacturer specifies the contract. In reality, the structure of the supply chain and the allocation of supply chain decision rights are themselves decision variables. In the above example, the firms may choose to vertically integrate thereby converting a decentralized supply chain to a centralized one. Even if the structure of the supply chain is unchanged, the allocation of decision rights may be modified and the manufacturer, for example, may be making the inventory decision. This NSERC research proposal will explore issues related to the structure of supply chains, and the allocation of decision rights in these chains. Specifically, the research proposed here will investigate: 1) who owns and controls inventory decisions in a supply chain, and why; 2) who controls the logistics function in a supply chain and what are the implications of this control; 3) what incentives can be put in place to encourage competitors in a supply chain to collaborate; and 4) how can collaboration be maintained among competitors?

多公司供应链的管理，协调和设计是工业工程师，运营和供应链经理和经济学家感兴趣的主题。传统上，该领域的研究集中在对运营决策的最佳控制上，例如供应链中库存的管理。 所使用的方法在很大程度上取决于优化理论。 在过去的十年中，新研究通过纳入激励措施来增强了这一文献。 游戏理论支持了这一额外的重点，并认识到所有供应链由多个独立决策者和个人决策者组成的事实，可以最大限度地利用自己的利益。 两种方法对于帮助识别和消除供应链效率低下都很重要，但是每种方法都隐含地假设供应链的结构是预先确定的。存在集中式决策者，或者存在多个决策者。 此外，模型假定供应链决策的控制是预先确定的。 例如，在典型的供应链模型中，制造商将产品出售给零售商，零售商在制造商指定合同的同时做出库存决定。 实际上，供应链的结构和供应链决策权的分配本身就是决策变量。 在上面的示例中，公司可以选择垂直整合，从而将分散的供应链转换为集中式供应链。 即使供应链的结构不变，决策权的分配也可以修改，例如，制造商可能正在做出库存决策。 这项NSERC研究建议将探讨与供应链结构以及这些链中决策权分配有关的问题。 具体而言，这里提出的研究将调查：1）谁拥有并控制供应链中的库存决策，以及为什么； 2）谁控制供应链中的物流功能以及该控制的含义是什么； 3）可以采取哪些激励措施来鼓励供应链中的竞争对手进行协作； 4）如何在竞争对手中保持协作？