Minimal Mindreading in Great Apes and Young Children

类人猿和幼儿的最小读心能力

• 批准号: 2267016
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of St Andrews
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2267016
• 关键词: Minimal; Mindreading; Great; Apes; Young

The project will test the two-system mindreading hypothesis which holds that the mindreading ability (attributing mental states to others) of nonhuman animals and infants is subject to signature limits which set it apart from a more sophisticated system displayed by older children and adults. A cognitively more sophisticated system may process 'beliefs as such' whilst the limited system processes registrations - belief-like states that are limited in that they cannot process propositions about identity (which is required for 'beliefs as such'). Registrations resemble beliefs and either could be used to pass the benchmark test of belief-reasoning - the change-of-location false belief task. The change-of-location false belief task consists of a subject viewing an actor put a desired object in one of two containers. Subsequently, the actor leaves the scene and, unbeknownst to actor but not the subject, another actor changes the location of the object to a different location. When the first actor returns, the subject should indicate where it expects the actor to look for the object. Crucially, the subject is not necessarily representing a propositional belief of the actor (i.e. 'they believe the object to be hidden there') but could also solve the task by tracking the relation of the actor and an object; in other words, by registering the actor's relation to the object. In order to reveal which of the systems is being deployed in a false belief test, the test needs to require representing also under which aspect is an object represented in another's mind - an object needs change identities. This change-of-identity task would tease apart the successful performance of the limited mindreaders from the sophisticated ones: a limited mindreader would pass the change-of-location task but fail the change-of-identity task; the sophisticated mindreader would pass both.According to some authors, children under the age of four and nonhuman animals have a limited system and cannot represent others' aspectual representations (which requires a sophisticated system). Given that apes and young children have been reported to pass an implicit change-of-location false belief task in which their looking behaviour was recorded (in lieu of explicit predictions such as pointing or verbalising), the same eye-tracking methodology can be used with an aspectual false belief task. The two-system hypothesis predicts that, while successful in the change-of-location task, apes and children should fail at a change-of-identity task. The overall aim of this project is to test this hypothesis and further illuminate the way great apes and young children represent the mental states of others, which in turn informs the nature of their social cognition more broadly.

该项目将测试非人类动物和婴儿的思维能力（将精神状态归因于其他人的心理状态（将精神状态归因于他人）受到签名限制，这使它与年龄较大的儿童和成人展示的更复杂的系统不同。认知上更复杂的系统可能会处理“这样的信念”，而有限的系统处理注册 - 类似信念的状态，因为他们无法处理有关身份的命题（这是“这样的信念”所必需的）。注册类似于信念，并且可以用来通过信念 - 策划的基准测试 - 位置变化错误的信念任务。位置变更错误信念任务由观看演员的主题组成，将所需的对象放在两个容器之一中。随后，演员离开了现场，而不是演员，但不是主题，另一个演员将对象的位置更改为另一个位置。当第一位演员返回时，主题应指示演员在何处寻找对象。至关重要的是，该主题不一定代表演员的命题信念（即“他们相信要隐藏在那里的对象”），而是可以通过跟踪演员和对象的关系来解决任务；换句话说，通过注册演员与对象的关系。为了揭示错误的信念测试中的哪些系统正在部署，该测试还需要表示在他人脑海中表示的对象下，对象需要更改身份。这种身份的变化任务将使有限的思维读者与精致的任务取得成功：有限的思维者将通过位置更改任务，但失败了身份更改任务；精致的思维读者将同时通过两者。根据一些作者，四岁以下的儿童和非人类动物的系统有限，无法代表他人的方面表示（这需要一个复杂的系统）。鉴于据报道，猿猴和幼儿通过了隐含的位置变更错误的信念任务，其中记录了他们的外观行为（代替了诸如指向或口头表达的明确预测），因此可以将相同的眼睛跟踪方法与方面的错误信念任务一起使用。两系统的假设预测，尽管在定位任务上成功，但猿类和儿童应在身份变化任务上失败。该项目的总体目的是检验这一假设，并进一步阐明大猿和幼儿代表他人的心理状态的方式，这反过来又更广泛地为他们的社会认知提供了本质。