Designing Efficient Market Mechanisms with Simplicity Requirements

设计具有简单性要求的高效市场机制

• 批准号: EP/X021696/1
• 负责人: Bart De Keijzer
• 金额: $ 28.22万
• 依托单位: King's College London
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2024
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2024 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FX021696%2F1
• 关键词: Designing; Efficient; Market; Mechanisms; Simplicity

This research proposal aims to investigate the notion of simplicity in the design of market mechanisms. The main motivation for this study is the observation that simple and transparent mechanisms are more likely to be used in practice due to the ease of understanding the mechanism's properties from the point of view of the participants (i.e., traders in the market). Simple mechanisms moreover tend to be easy to implement, and generally are not time-consuming to run. The term "market mechanism" refers to the platform and protocols by which a market operates. A market is a two-sided platform, where both buyers and sellers are participating agents, and both types of agents follow a trading mechanism set out by an intermediating party. The proposed research is of a theoretical nature, yet is motivated by practical applications. One of the main practical motivators is the ever-rising presence of e-commerce, and the need for transparent and efficient market mechanisms in e-commerce applications. The challenges addressed in this proposal are relevant to a range of large-scale applications, such as those in the sharing/access economy (where ride-sharing platforms and lodging platforms form well-known examples; they are applications that function essentially as market mechanisms), online marketplaces, and online advertising mechanisms. The need for simplicity in mechanism design has furthermore been called for in various recent works in micro-economic theory and computer science.The research proposal captures market platforms in an abstract framework into which the above application domains can be cast. It then plans to investigate through two work packages which desirable properties can possibly be guaranteed by which market mechanisms, while achieving a high performance both economically (i.e., the resulting social welfare should be high) and computationally (i.e., the runtime of such a mechanism should be low). The properties we require from these mechanisms are the economically standard notions of strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and budget-balance. Furthermore, we require our mechanisms to be "simple" and will investigate suitable formalisations of this concept. The two work packages examine the problem into two opposing directions: The first work package intends to analyse the most atomic case within our framework, where only one buyer, one seller, and one item is present. The second work package aims to design mechanisms for increasingly more general instances of the framework (e.g., considering many buyers and sellers, and many items with increasingly complex and possibly interdependent valuations for these items among the buyers and sellers).

该研究建议旨在调查市场机制设计中简单性的概念。这项研究的主要动机是观察到，由于从参与者的角度（即市场上的交易者），很容易理解机制的特性，因此更有可能在实践中使用简单和透明的机制。此外，简单的机制往往易于实施，并且通常不耗时运行。 “市场机制”一词是指市场运营的平台和协议。市场是两个方面的平台，买卖双方都在参与代理商，两种类型的代理都遵循中间方制定的交易机制。拟议的研究具有理论性质，但是出于实际应用的动机。主要的动机之一是电子商务的不断增长，以及在电子商务应用中对透明有效的市场机制的需求。本提案中针对的挑战与一系列大规模应用程序有关，例如共享/访问经济中的挑战（在共享/访问经济中（其中乘车共享平台和住宿平台构成了众所周知的示例；它们是实质上起作用的市场机制的应用），在线市场和在线广告机制。此外，在微观经济理论和计算机科学方面的各种著作中都需要对机制设计的简单性。研究建议在一个抽象的框架中捕获了市场平台，可以将上述应用领域施加在其中。然后，它计划通过两个工作包进行调查，这些工作包可以通过哪种市场机制来保证，同时在经济上获得高性能（即，由此产生的社会福利都应该高）和计算（即，这种机制的运行时间都应较低）。我们从这些机制中需要的属性是策略预算，个人理性和预算平衡的经济标准概念。此外，我们要求我们的机制“简单”，并将研究此概念的合适形式化。这两个工作包将问题检查到两个相反的方向：第一个工作包打算在我们的框架内分析最原子的情况，其中只有一个买家，一个卖方和一个物品。第二个工作套餐旨在设计越来越多的框架实例的机制（例如，考虑到许多买卖双方，以及许多物品在买卖双方中对这些物品的估值越来越复杂且可能相互依存）。