RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE FAMILY

风险、保险和家庭

• 批准号: 2200548
• 负责人: ROBERT M TOWNSEND
• 金额: $ 9.63万
• 依托单位: NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-09-01 至 1995-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/2200548
• 关键词: RISK; INSURANCE; FAMILY

Proposed here: 1. develop a general equilibrium prototype model of the poor high risk village or region as an open economy with risk from variable monsoon rains, crop, and human diseases, and variable prices; 2. derive under weak assumptions about technology and preferences optimal risk-sharing implications for age-sex adjusted per person consumption and individual labor supply, taking into account that family consumptions, not individual consumptions are measured in ICRISAT data, that family size and age compositions often vary considerably over time, that sampled households are a subset of the entire village or regional economy and that there is variable labor force participation due to sickness, disability, age, and temporary and permanent migration; 3. show the model's implications for final allocations allow the researcher to distinguish aggregate shocks, which are not insurable, from idiosyncratic shock, which potentially are insurable; 4. Conduct the appropriate statistical tests of the demographically-adjusted risk-sharing formulas: (a) age-sex adjusted per family member consumptions and individual leisures are determined by village or regional aggregates of these variables, only (b) having controlled for these aggregate variables, age-sex adjusted per family member consumptions and individual leisures should be immune from fluctuations in family crop outputs, profits from crop production, profits from all sources, wages, and full incomes and immune also from demographic variables such as age, household size, number of children and number of migrants (as not controlled for in the risk-bearing formulas); 5. quantify which, if any, economic or demographic shocks are not insured; similarly, verify if low-asset or low-income households are more likely to be uninsured; 6. document the extent of diversity across households in each village with respect to soil types, irrigation status, crop choice possibilities, and income sources. Thus quantify the extent to which households are doing the same thing and are subject to the same shocks to see if that explains observed comovements in consumptions. Similarly, derive household incomes after the buying and selling of physical stocks to see if households self-insure. Quantify the residual difference between income-after-self- insurance and consumption to measure the extent of community based transfers; and 7. classify and measure transfers by type (gifts, borrowing-lending) and by source (family,caste, other) to quantify the role of the immediate and extended family in the larger community context.

在此提出的：1。开发一般平衡原型模型 高风险村庄或地区作为开放经济的贫困，风险 可变的季风降雨，农作物和人类疾病以及可变价格； 2。在对技术和偏好的薄弱假设下得出 对每人年龄性别调整的最佳风险分享含义 考虑到该家庭的消费和个人劳动力供应 消费量，而不是个人消费量是在iCrisat数据中衡量的， 随着时间的流逝，家庭规模和年龄组成通常有很大差异， 抽样的家庭是整个村庄或地区的子集 经济，由于 疾病，残疾，年龄以及暂时和永久性移民； 3。 显示模型对最终分配的影响允许研究人员 区分不可保险的总冲击 特质冲击，可能是可保险的； 4。进行 对人口统计学调整的适当统计测试 风险分享公式：（a）每个家庭成员调整年龄的年龄 消费和个人休闲由村庄或 这些变量的区域骨料，仅（b）控制了 这些骨料变量，每个家庭成员的年龄性别调整 消费和个人休闲应免受波动的影响 在家庭作物产量，农作物生产中的利润，所有的利润 来源，工资和全部收入，也可以免疫人群 年龄，家庭规模，儿童人数和数量等变量 移民（在承担风险的公式中不受控制）； 5。 量化哪种（如果有的话）没有保险； 同样，验证低资产或低收入家庭是否更有可能 没有保险； 6.记录家庭之间多样性的程度 在每个村庄，关于土壤类型，灌溉状况，作物 选择的可能性和收入来源。 因此量化了 哪些家庭正在做同样的事情，并受到相同的约束 震惊以查看这是否解释了观察到的消费中的合并。 同样，在买卖后获得家庭收入 物理库存以查看家庭是否自我保险。量化残差 收入自付保险和消费之间的差异 衡量基于社区的转移的程度；和7。分类和 按类型（礼物，借贷）和来源测量转移 （家庭，种姓，其他）量化直接和扩展的作用 在更大的社区背景下的家庭。