The Study of Economic Efficiency and Traditional Custom of Chinese Farm Household's Behavior based on the New Institutional Economics Methods: How should they deal with WTO system?

基于新制度经济学方法的经济效率与中国农户传统习俗行为研究：他们该如何应对WTO体制？

基本信息

批准号：
16580178
负责人：
ASAMI Atsuyuki
金额：
$ 2.46万
依托单位：
Kyoto University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2004
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2004 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

We conducted village surveys of Shandong in 2004, Liaoning in 2005, Hubei in2006 and Beijing in 2007 respectively. 3 villages were selected for research in each province. 30farmers were interviewed in each village about economic and customary behavior of many kinds of transactions. We analyzed econometrically the micro data of farmers that were collected by above mentioned way and clarified the new facts as follows.Even nowadays, economic transaction of rural China is self-enfoceable without any judiciary third party, which is called as transaction embedded in customary way. Rural China's customary institution is characterized as socially networked nepotism based on gift giving. The generalized attributes of gift giving nepotism are characterized as follows. (1) Personally related transaction is adopted, because the close relationship can save the gift giving cost. (2) In the traditional reciprocal agriculture sector, the gifts are exchanged equally, so that the transactions are bilate … More ral and not related to the profits. In the stratified non-agriculture sector, the gift is presented as the signal of needed help towards high income powered man. (3) The gift giving nepotism basically supports only the supplier-demander relationship. But it also supports the efficient competition relationship among suppliers or among demanders, because the bargaining strategies using the competitive second best as threat points are adopted.These characters are tested by the collected micro data as follows.(1) The fact that personally related transactions are still utilized in rural area is observed. (2) The gifts are exchanged among farmers and not related the profit in agricultural sector. In non-agriculture sector, however, the gift payments are used as signal and statistically significantly contributed to the profit making. (3) Even in the land rent market where the gift giving nepotism is still used, the value of marginal productivity of land is equal to rent payment, that is, the competition is actually efficient. Less

我们分别于2004年、2005年辽宁、2006年湖北和2007年对北京进行了村庄调查，每个村庄采访了30名农民，对多种交易的经济和习惯行为进行了分析。对通过上述方式收集到的农民微观数据进行了计量经济学分析，并阐明了新的事实如下。即使在今天，中国农村的经济交易仍然是送礼裙带关系是一种无需司法第三方即可自行执行的行为，被称为“习惯性交易”。采用关联交易，因为关系密切可以节省送礼成本。 (2)在传统的互惠农业领域，礼物是平等交换的，因此交易是双向的。在分层的非农业部门，礼物被视为对高收入人群的需要帮助的信号。（3）送礼裙带关系基本上只支持供需关系，但它也支持。有效供应商之间或需求者之间的竞争关系，因为采用了以竞争次优为威胁点的讨价还价策略。通过收集到的微观数据对这些特征进行了如下检验。（1）个人关联交易仍然被利用观察农村地区（2）。礼物是农民之间交换的，与农业部门的利润无关，但在非农业部门，礼物支付被用作信号，记者对利润做出了巨大贡献（3）即使在土地租赁市场上。仍然采用送礼裙带关系，土地的边际生产力价值等于租金，即竞争实际上效率较低。