Mechanism Design for Avoiding Social Dilemma-From the Stand point of Game Theory and Experimental Economics-

避免社会困境的机制设计——从博弈论和实验经济学的角度看——

基本信息

批准号：
16310107
负责人：
MUTO Shigeo
金额：
$ 10.43万
依托单位：
Tokyo Institute of Technology
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
财政年份：
2004
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2004 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The aim of this project is to propose mechanisms which implement desirable outcomes in various social dilemma situations such as information trading, provision of public goods, environmental pollution, etc. The project started with three members, Muto, Yamato and Hidano. Muto developed game theoretical models and studied applicability of "stable set", a solution concept in cooperative game theory, to social dilemma problems. Yamato designed mechanisms to implement desirable outcomes and evaluated their performance by conducting experiments. Hidano incorporated agents' utility and their changes into the mechanisms. Then two other members joined. Higuchi conducted statistical and econometric study of social dilemma problems ; and Yamamuro overviewed historical developments of mechanisms to solve social dilemma problems. Principal findings are summarized as follows :1. Make clear the stable set outcomes when agents behave with farsightedness in social dilemma situations.2. On the basis of the outcomes in 1, design mechanisms to prevent free-riding in provision of public goods and to prevent overproduction of information.3. Examine performance of the mechanisms by conducting experiments; and find that agents behave coalitionally, which was not expected.4. Design new mechanisms which take into account coalition formation among agents.5. Examine performance of the new mechanisms; and find that they work well to prevent social dilemmas.

该项目的目的是提出在各种社会困境情况下（例如信息交易，提供公共物品，环境污染等）实施理想结果的机制。该项目始于三名成员Muto，Yamato和Hidano。 Muto开发了游戏理论模型，并研究了“稳定集”（合作游戏理论中的解决方案概念）对社会困境问题的适用性。亚马托设计的机制可以实现理想的结果，并通过进行实验来评估其性能。 Hidano将代理商的效用及其变化纳入了机制。然后另外两个成员加入了。 Higuchi对社会困境问题进行了统计和计量经济学研究；雅穆罗（Yamamuro）概述了解决社会困境问题的机制的历史发展。主要发现总结如下：1。当代理商在社会困境情况下以远视性的行为表现出来时，请清除稳定的结局。2。根据1在1中的结果，设计机制，以防止自由骑行提供公共物品并防止信息过量生产。3。通过进行实验检查机制的性能；并发现代理商在联盟上的行为，这是没有预期的。4。设计新机制，考虑了代理之间的联盟形成。5。检查新机制的性能；并发现它们可以很好地防止社会困境。