A theoretical and empirical Study on international coordination of Intellectual Property Rights

知识产权国际协调的理论与实证研究

• 批准号: 16530179
• 负责人: OKAMURA Makoto
• 金额: $ 1.6万
• 依托单位: HIROSIMA University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2004 至 2005
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16530179/
• 关键词: Licensing; international coordination of intellectual property rights; Complementary technology; Litigation cost; Exhaustion; Parallel Import; Drug Price Control; 技術開発; 価格介入; ライセンス契約; ナッシュ的交渉; Litigation cost; ブランダー・スペンサーモデル

We investigate the effect of intellectual property rights(IPR) on the outcome and welfare through licensing in duopolistic firms with patented two complementary technologies. We explore a condition on the extent of enforcement of IPR and the litigation cost of the infringer firm under which inefficient/ efficient social surplus of monopoly/duopoly realizes.Next, we construct a three country trade model composed of two (one developed and another developing) exporting countries' firms and one importing country. With licensing of developed country's firm technology with IPR, exhaustion of IPR and litigation for infringement of her IPR, we derive a sub game perfect Nash equilibrium.Then, we examine how parallel import influences pharmaceutical innovation and the whole welfare, when cross national drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but governmental drug price control based factors. By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based factors, we show that parallel import may enhance pharmaceutical innovation, under some conditions on the bargaining power of a foreign government and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.Finally, we derive the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions in duopolistic firms with patent. two complementary technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes.

我们通过使用专利的两种互补技术在双向垄断公司的许可中调查知识产权（IPR）对结果和福利的影响。我们探讨了有关IPR执行范围以及侵权公司诉讼成本的条件，在该范围内，垄断/二民垄断的效率低下/有效的社会盈余实现。我们构建了一个三个国家贸易模式，由两个（一个开发和另一个发展）的出口国和一个进口国组成。通过IPR，IPR的耗尽和侵犯她的IPR诉讼的许可，我们得出了一个子游戏完美的NASH均衡。通过明确考虑基于政府的基于政府的基于政府的基于政府的因素，我们表明，在某些条件下，对外国政府的议价能力以及外国市场需求的价格弹性，平行进口可以增强药物创新。 We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.Finally, we derive the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions in duopolistic firms with patent.两种补充技术。我们发现，侵权人的模仿成本的条件以及原告公司在诉讼中赢得诉讼的可能性，他们之间可以签订单方面许可/交叉许可，并有效地实现了少数力的社会盈余。

项目成果

Parallel Trade, Pharmaceutical Innovation, and Intellectual Rights

平行贸易、医药创新和知识产权

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: Working Paper Series, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies No.0018
• 作者: 田畑顕;岡村誠;新海哲哉;田中悟
• 通讯作者: 田中悟

An Analysis on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing and Welfare, (in Japanese)

知识产权执法、许可和福利分析（日语）

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: The Journal of Social Science (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo) vol.56, Nos.3・4
• 作者: Tetusya Shinkai;et al.
• 通讯作者: et al.

国際貿易と知的財産権制度の理論的分析

国际贸易与知识产权制度理论分析

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 経済学論究(関西学院大学経済学部紀要) 59巻2号
• 作者: 新海哲哉;田中悟;岡村誠;田畑顕
• 通讯作者: 田畑顕

ライセンス契約、国際貿易、消尽および知的財産権の行使

许可协议、国际贸易、知识产权用尽和执行

• 发表时间: 2005
• 期刊: 経済学論究 59。2
• 作者: 新海哲哉;田中悟;岡村誠
• 通讯作者: 岡村誠

A Note on licensing of complementary technologies and enforcement of intellectual property rights, (in Japanese)

关于补充技术许可和知识产权执法的说明（日语）

• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: The Journal of Economics of Kwansei Gakuin University vol.58, No.3
• 作者: Tetusya Shinkai;et al.
• 通讯作者: et al.