Psycho-social Foundations for Building Trust Societies

建立信任社会的心理社会基础

基本信息

批准号：
14201014
负责人：
YAMAGISHI Toshio
金额：
$ 31.53万
依托单位：
HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The goal of this study was to clarify the mechanisms that promote voluntarily based social order, not constrained by the closed nature of social relations, in a situation in which provision is "assurance" of security based on commitment relations is not possible. We used "artificial societies" created in the laboratory to achieve this goal. As a means to achieve this goal, we found that building a trust relationship (i.e., transforming an opportunistic relationship into a trust relationship) requires risk taking. We further identified socio-relational and socio-institutional conditions that are required for this transformation. Specifically, our results indicate the followings. ◆Risk taking plays an indispensable role in building a trust relationship. ◆In building a trust relationship, a strategy to cooperate while reducing the risk of trusting to the minimal is highly effective. ◆The role that reputation plays in reducing the agency problem caused by information asymmetry varies depending on the nature of the society or market-whether it is open or closed. Negative reputation is effective in closed societies, and positive reputation is effective in closed societies. ◆Punishment of non-cooperators in a group is produced by a different psychological mechanism that produces punishment of out-group defectors. ◆Heuristics explain cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game better than utility transformation model. ◆Expectation of generalized exchange within a group is indispensable in cooperation toward in-group members, whether the groups are minimal groups or nationality groups. However, it is not a necessary condition for cooperation toward in-group members when interactions among group members exist. ◆Experience of collectivistic social institutions make collectivistic (or interdependent) self-construal and causal attribution (i.e., collectivistic belief system) salient.

这项研究的目的是澄清促进基于社会关系的社会秩序的机制，而不是受到社会关系的封闭性质的限制，在这种情况下，基于承诺关系的提供是“保证”安全性的。我们使用在实验室中创建的“人工社会”来实现这一目标。作为实现这一目标的一种手段，我们发现建立信任关系（即将机会主义关系转变为信任关系）需要冒险。我们进一步确定了这种转变所需的社会关系和社会机构条件。具体而言，我们的结果表明以下内容。 ◆冒险冒险在建立信任关系中起着必不可少的作用。 ◆在建立信任关系时，一种协调的策略，同时降低信任最小的风险是非常有效的。 ◆◆根据社会或市场的性质，无论是开放还是关闭，声誉在减少信息不对称品种引起的代理问题中所起的作用。负面审查在封闭的社会中有效，积极审查在封闭的社会中有效。 ◆对一个小组中的非同伴的惩罚是由产生群体外叛逃者惩罚的不同心理机制产生的。 ◆启发式法解释了一声囚犯的困境游戏中的合作，而不是公用事业转换模型。 ◆对集团内广义交流的期望在与小组内成员的合作中是必不可少的，无论这些团体是最小的群体还是国籍群体。但是，当存在组成员之间的互动时，与团体内成员合作并不是必要的条件。 ◆集体社会制度的经验使集体主义（或相互依存）的自我建构和因果属性（即集体信仰体系）显着。