The Political Economy of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Situations

冲突后局势中权力分享的政治经济学

基本信息

批准号：
280367933
负责人：
Professor Dr. Andreas Mehler
金额：
--
依托单位：
Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung e.V. Freiburg (ABI)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/280367933?language=en
关键词：
Political Economy Power Sharing Post

项目摘要

How does power-sharing affect resource allocation between elites and constituencies in post-conflict situations? The question if and how power-sharing arrangements between a state government and former rebel groups actually change the distribution and exercise of political power in a post-conflict situation is rarely investigated. In this proposed research project, we argue that the type of power-sharing affects sub-national resource allocation patterns. Power-sharing provides an opportunity for former conflict actors to access state resources and distribute those resources strategically to their constituencies. Personalized power-sharing arrangements between political elites facilitate self-enrichment and are therefore hypothesized to result in low levels of resource allocation towards their constituencies. Structural power-sharing institutions, in contrast, facilitate a focused resource allocation to strategically important core constituencies. We also hypothesize that constituency size will moderate the relationship between structural power-sharing and sub-national resource allocation. The expected benefit of such targeted resource allocation will increase with the size of elites' support bases. We further expect post-conflict resource allocation to vary with type and level of government income. A higher share of non-tax income such as natural resources and specific types of foreign aid is likely to be associated with more pronounced patterns of patronage between elites in power-sharing arrangements and their constituencies. Ultimately, our theory implies that power-sharing is less a tool for transforming political power (and thus addressing the root causes of social conflict), but an instrument that institutionalizes patronage opportunities. The proposed project relies on the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to substantiate these hypotheses: We first use statistical geo-spatial methods in order to investigate power-sharing as mechanism for sub-national resource redistribution to core constituencies. This analysis will make use of global data on post-conflict situations between 1992 and 2010. Central to this effort will be the creation of a novel dataset, the Geographical Dimensions of Power-Sharing Dataset (GDPS) which geo-locates the constituencies of all government and rebels in post-conflict situations. In a second step, we will conduct qualitative within-case analyses and in-depth process tracing of two post-conflict situations: Liberia and the Indonesian province of Aceh. This qualitative analysis will be based on field research in each post-conflict situation to better understand causal processes and scope conditions.

冲突后局势中权力分享如何影响精英和选民之间的资源分配？州政府与前反叛团体之间的权力分享安排是否以及如何真正改变冲突后局势中政治权力的分配和行使的问题很少被调查。在这个拟议的研究项目中，我们认为权力共享的类型会影响地方资源分配模式。权力分享为前冲突参与者提供了获取国家资源并将这些资源战略性分配给其选民的机会。政治精英之间的个性化权力分享安排有利于自我致富，因此被认为会导致其选民的资源分配水平较低。相比之下，结构性权力共享机构有助于将资源集中配置到具有战略意义的核心选民。我们还假设选区规模将调节结构性权力共享和地方资源分配之间的关系。这种有针对性的资源配置的预期收益将随着精英支持基础的规模而增加。我们进一步预计冲突后资源分配将根据政府收入的类型和水平而变化。自然资源和特定类型的外国援助等非税收入的较高份额可能与权力分享安排中的精英与其选民之间更明显的庇护模式有关。最终，我们的理论表明，权力分享不是转变政治权力（从而解决社会冲突的根源）的工具，而是将庇护机会制度化的工具。拟议的项目依靠定量和定性方法的结合来证实这些假设：我们首先使用统计地理空间方法来研究权力共享作为将地方资源重新分配给核心选区的机制。该分析将利用 1992 年至 2010 年间冲突后局势的全球数据。这项工作的核心将是创建一个新颖的数据集，即权力共享数据集的地理维度 (GDPS)，该数据集对所有选区进行地理定位。冲突后局势中的政府和叛乱分子。第二步，我们将对利比里亚和印度尼西亚亚齐省这两个冲突后局势进行定性案例内分析和深入的过程追踪。这种定性分析将基于对每种冲突后局势的实地研究，以更好地了解因果过程和范围条件。