The Political Economy of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Situations

冲突后局势中权力分享的政治经济学

基本信息

批准号：
280367933
负责人：
Professor Dr. Andreas Mehler
金额：
--
依托单位：
Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschung e.V. Freiburg (ABI)
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/280367933?language=en
关键词：
Political Economy Power Sharing Post

项目摘要

How does power-sharing affect resource allocation between elites and constituencies in post-conflict situations? The question if and how power-sharing arrangements between a state government and former rebel groups actually change the distribution and exercise of political power in a post-conflict situation is rarely investigated. In this proposed research project, we argue that the type of power-sharing affects sub-national resource allocation patterns. Power-sharing provides an opportunity for former conflict actors to access state resources and distribute those resources strategically to their constituencies. Personalized power-sharing arrangements between political elites facilitate self-enrichment and are therefore hypothesized to result in low levels of resource allocation towards their constituencies. Structural power-sharing institutions, in contrast, facilitate a focused resource allocation to strategically important core constituencies. We also hypothesize that constituency size will moderate the relationship between structural power-sharing and sub-national resource allocation. The expected benefit of such targeted resource allocation will increase with the size of elites' support bases. We further expect post-conflict resource allocation to vary with type and level of government income. A higher share of non-tax income such as natural resources and specific types of foreign aid is likely to be associated with more pronounced patterns of patronage between elites in power-sharing arrangements and their constituencies. Ultimately, our theory implies that power-sharing is less a tool for transforming political power (and thus addressing the root causes of social conflict), but an instrument that institutionalizes patronage opportunities. The proposed project relies on the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to substantiate these hypotheses: We first use statistical geo-spatial methods in order to investigate power-sharing as mechanism for sub-national resource redistribution to core constituencies. This analysis will make use of global data on post-conflict situations between 1992 and 2010. Central to this effort will be the creation of a novel dataset, the Geographical Dimensions of Power-Sharing Dataset (GDPS) which geo-locates the constituencies of all government and rebels in post-conflict situations. In a second step, we will conduct qualitative within-case analyses and in-depth process tracing of two post-conflict situations: Liberia and the Indonesian province of Aceh. This qualitative analysis will be based on field research in each post-conflict situation to better understand causal processes and scope conditions.

在冲突后情况下，电力共享如何影响精英和选区之间的资源分配？问题以及如何在冲突后局势中改变政治权力的分配和行使政治权力的问题以及如何在冲突后的政治权力上进行的权力分享安排很少受到调查。在这个拟议的研究项目中，我们认为电力分担的类型会影响次国家资源分配模式。权力共享为前冲突参与者提供了机会，可以获取国家资源并将这些资源从战略上分配给其选区。政治精英之间的个性化权力共享安排有助于自我灌输，因此被认为可以使资源分配较低。相比之下，结构性权力共享机构促进了对战略性重要的核心选区的集中资源分配。我们还假设选区的规模将调节结构性分享和次国资源分配之间的关系。这种目标资源分配的预期收益将随着精英支持基础的规模而增加。我们进一步期望冲突后的资源分配会随政府收入的类型和水平而变化。非税收收入（例如自然资源和特定类型的外国援助）中较高的份额可能与精英分享安排中的精英之间更为明显的光顾及其选区有关。最终，我们的理论暗示，共享权力不是改变政治权力的工具（从而解决了社会冲突的根本原因），而是一种使光顾机会制度化的工具。拟议的项目依赖于定量和定性方法的结合来证实这些假设：我们首先使用统计的地理空间方法，以将功率共享作为核心资源重新分布的机制，以供核心组成部分。该分析将利用1992年至2010年之间冲突后情况的全球数据。这项工作的核心将是创建一个新颖的数据集，功率共享数据集（GDP）（GDP）的地理维度，该数据集（GDPS）将所有政府和叛乱分子的组合后情况下的组合。在第二步中，我们将进行定性的内部分析和深入的过程追踪两种冲突后情况：利比里亚和印度尼西亚省的亚齐省。这种定性分析将基于每种冲突后情况下的现场研究，以更好地了解因果过程和范围条件。