The Allocation of Talent to Finance: Welfare, Growth, and Employment Effects

金融人才配置：福利、增长和就业效应

• 批准号: 267247029
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Lutz Arnold
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Priority Programmes
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2014-12-31 至 2017-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/267247029?language=en
• 关键词: Allocation; Talent; Finance; Welfare; Growth

The recent financial turbulence and its macroeconomic repercussions have sparked a discussion about the social benefits of financial trading. At the policy level, the discussion centers around the question of how to contain excessive risk taking by banks in view of explicit safety nets and implicit state guarantees. While the significance of this question cannot be overestimated, there is a different concern, which might be of equal importance for long-term growth and economic welfare, viz., that the financial sector attracts too much talent, which could produce larger social benefits in different occupations. The purpose of the proposed project is to investigate theoretically under which circumstances the allocation of talent to finance is excessive. To do so, we develop a new model, based on the noisy rational expectations equilibrium model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), in which agents who specialize in finance promote informational efficiency, but at the cost that they do not contribute to the production of real output. We study the impact of occupational choice on agents' welfare as well as on macroeconomic growth, production sector wages, and employment.

最近的金融动荡及其宏观经济影响引发了关于金融交易社会效益的讨论。在政策层面，讨论的焦点是在明确的安全网和隐性的国家担保的情况下如何遏制银行过度承担风险的问题。虽然这个问题的重要性怎么估计都不为过，但还有一个不同的担忧，这对于长期增长和经济福利可能同样重要，即金融部门吸引了太多人才，这可能会在以下领域产生更大的社会效益：不同的职业。本项目的目的是从理论上探讨在何种情况下金融人才配置过度。为此，我们基于 Grossman 和 Stiglitz（1980）的噪声理性预期均衡模型开发了一个新模型，其中专门从事金融的代理人提高了信息效率，但代价是他们不为生产做出贡献。实际输出。我们研究职业选择对代理人福利以及宏观经济增长、生产部门工资和就业的影响。