CRII: SaTC: Reliable Hardware Architectures Against Side-Channel Attacks for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

CRII：SaTC：针对后量子密码算法的侧通道攻击的可靠硬件架构

• 批准号: 2348261
• 负责人: Alvaro Cintas Canto
• 金额: $ 17.5万
• 依托单位: Marymount University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2024
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2024-04-15 至 2026-03-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2348261&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CRII; SaTC; Reliable; Hardware; Architectures; CRII; SaTC; Reliable; Hardware; Architectures

The rapid developments in quantum computing threaten the security of traditional computer systems, because they use a form of encryption called public-key, that will no longer be secure if quantum computing advances. New approaches developed to avert this security problem are known as Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) led a 2016 effort to standardize quantum-resistant public-key approaches. NIST has recently selected four algorithms for standardization and has chosen three other algorithms as potential candidates. However, these algorithms are not without vulnerabilities, and the majority are susceptible to both certain types of cyber attacks and environmentally induced faults. Such vulnerabilities can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and system failure. This project aims to perform a rigorous evaluation of the PQC algorithms and to design, simulate, and implement tailored countermeasures against these threats. This cutting-edge research will be incorporated into graduate-level courses.This project aims to advance the field of PQC by performing a detailed analysis of existing algorithms, identifying vulnerabilities to SCAs, and formulating countermeasures against such attacks and environmentally induced faults. Due to the complex nature of deriving such techniques, software simulations will need to be done to verify these mathematical derivations. Following rigorous software simulations, these countermeasures will be integrated into the original hardware architectures such as FGPA or ASIC to assess their real-world overheads, with a focus on compatibility with deeply constrained embedded systems prevalent in the military, governmental, and commercial sectors.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

量子计算中的快速发展威胁着传统计算机系统的安全性，因为它们使用一种称为公钥的加密形式，如果量子计算进步，这种加密将不再安全。为避免这种安全问题而开发的新方法被称为量词后加密术（PQC），美国国家标准技术研究所（NIST）领导了2016年的努力，以标准化抗量子的公开钥匙方法。 NIST最近选择了四种标准化算法，并选择了其他三种算法作为潜在的候选者。但是，这些算法并非没有漏洞，大多数易受某些类型的网络攻击和环境引起的断层的影响。这种漏洞可能导致未经授权访问敏感信息和系统故障。该项目旨在对PQC算法进行严格的评估，并设计，模拟和实施针对这些威胁的量身定制的对策。该项目旨在通过对现有算法进行详细分析，确定对SCAS的脆弱性以及针对此类攻击和环境诱发的断层的对策，将这项尖端研究纳入研究生级课程中。由于得出此类技术的复杂性质，需要进行软件模拟来验证这些数学推导。遵循严格的软件模拟，这些对策将集成到原始硬件架构（例如FGPA或ASIC）等原始硬件架构中，以评估其现实世界的间接费用，重点是兼容，与密切约束的嵌入式系统中普遍存在的嵌入式系统中普遍存在，在军事，政府和商业领域中，这些奖项通过NSF的合法传教士和广阔的范围进行了评估。 标准。