Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Theoretical Foundations of Block Ciphers

协作研究：SaTC：核心：媒介：分组密码的理论基础

基本信息

批准号：
2154174
负责人：
Stefano Tessaro
金额：
$ 60万
依托单位：
University of Washington
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2022
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2022-06-01 至 2026-05-31
项目状态：
未结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2154174&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Collaborative Research SaTC CORE Medium

项目摘要

Block ciphers, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), are fundamental cryptographic algorithms which act as basic building blocks in most secure systems in use today. AES alone is used to protect the confidentiality of a large fraction of Internet traffic as a component of secure-communication protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS). It is therefore imperative to assess the security of existing and new block cipher designs as far as possible. Following a well-established paradigm developed by cryptographers over the last four decades, the gold standard for security validation would be a proof of security based on the conjectured hardness of some well-studied computational problems. However, due to extreme efficiency demands, practical block ciphers evade this classical paradigm of provable security. Instead, confidence relies on decades of cryptanalysis and an inability to find concrete attacks.The main aim of this project is to narrow the existing gap between provable security and cryptanalysis, developing in particular security proofs against limited classes of attacks, and eventually designing new algorithms and paradigms based on the new findings of this project. The initial focus will be on proofs of security against classes of statistical attacks which attempt to uncover non-random properties in a small number of block-cipher outputs. A second thrust will then develop techniques to prove security against algebraic attacks. Finally, this project will initiate the study of important components of block ciphers which have not been studied rigorously so far, introducing in particular a new theory of key schedules. The treatment will cover both classical designs such as substitution-permutation networks, as well as less studied ones such as Add-Rotate-XOR (ARX) ciphers. The broader impacts of this project will include a workshop aimed at bridging the gap between theoretical cryptography and cryptanalysis, as well as an undergraduate research component.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

块密码（例如高级加密标准（AES））是基本的加密算法，在当今使用的大多数安全系统中充当基本构建块。仅AES仅用于保护大量互联网流量的机密性，这是安全通信协议（例如运输层安全性（TLS））的组成部分。因此，必须尽可能评估现有和新的密码设计的安全性。在过去的四十年中，密码学家开发了一个完善的范式之后，安全验证的黄金标准将是基于一些经过深入研究的计算问题的猜想硬度的证明。但是，由于极高的效率需求，实用的密码避免了这种经典的可证明安全性。取而代之的是，信心依赖于数十年的密码分析和无法找到具体攻击的信心。该项目的主要目的是缩小可证明的安全性和密码分析之间的现有差距，在针对有限的攻击类别的特定安全性证明中开发，并最终设计新的算法和范式，并根据该项目的新发现。最初的重点将放在针对统计攻击类别的安全性证明上，这些统计攻击试图发现少数块状输出输出中的非随机属性。然后，第二个推力将开发技术以证明抵抗代数攻击的安全性。最后，该项目将启动对块密码的重要组成部分的研究，这些组件到目前为止尚未进行严格研究，特别是引入了一种新的关键时间表理论。该处理将涵盖两个经典设计，例如替代 - 帝国网络，以及较少研究的网络，例如Add-Rotate-Xor（ARX）密码。该项目的更广泛的影响将包括一个研讨会，旨在弥合理论加密和隐式分析之间的差距，以及本科研究组件。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子和广泛影响的评估来通过评估来获得支持的。