Dynamic Strategic Corporate Finance

动态战略企业融资

• 批准号: 2117068
• 负责人: Ulrich Doraszelski
• 金额: $ 31.4万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2117068&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamic; Strategic; Corporate; Finance

AbstractThis research develops a new benchmark theoretical model to understand how imperfections in financial markets impact the strategic interactions between individual firms and the long run dynamics of different industries. The interplay between limited access to capital markets and strategic behavior by firms can have a significant impact on prices, corporate investment and the degree of industrial concentration. The project will show that financial frictions are consequential for the industrial organization. The findings will have important implications for corporate finance by taking into account the strategic interplay between firms.This project will explore how financial market imperfections impact dynamic strategic interactions between firms and industry. The project will develop a new benchmark theoretical setting that integrates core insights about the impact of financial frictions on investment with dynamic industrial organization. The first project constructs a parsimonious baseline tug-of-war theoretical setting in which two firms compete to enjoy a dominant position. The second project develops a workhorse settings used in applied corporate finance to analyze the impact of financial frictions on investment. Baseline model yields three preliminary findings: (i) Financial frictions often lead firms charge lower prices in equilibrium; (ii) Financial frictions may slow down industry concentration; and (ii) Even when financial frictions lead to a more concentrated industry in the long run, there is higher investment along the way. The project, on the overall suggests that financial frictions may act as a pro-competitive force.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

摘要这项研究开发了一种新的基准理论模型，以了解金融市场的缺陷如何影响单个公司与不同行业的长期动态之间的战略互动。有限的对资本市场的机会与公司的战略行为之间的相互作用可能会对价格，公司投资和工业集中程度产生重大影响。该项目将表明金融摩擦对工业组织是造成的。这些调查结果将考虑到公司之间的战略相互作用，对公司融资具有重要意义。该项目将探讨金融市场的缺陷如何影响企业与行业之间的动态战略互动。该项目将开发一个新的基准理论设置，该设置将有关金融摩擦对投资对投资的影响与动态工业组织的影响的核心见解相结合。第一个项目构建了一个简约的基线拔河理论环境，其中两家公司竞争享有主导地位。第二个项目开发了用于应用公司融资的主力设置，以分析金融摩擦对投资的影响。基线模型产生了三个初步发现：（i）金融摩擦通常导致公司收取较低的平衡价格； （ii）金融摩擦可能会减慢行业集中度； （ii）即使从长远来看，金融摩擦会导致更加集中的行业，一路上也有更高的投资。该项目总体表明，金融摩擦可以作为竞争力的力量。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并认为使用基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响审查标准，被认为值得通过评估。