Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land Transactions

合作研究：国际胁迫、债务减免和土地交易

• 批准号: 2048406
• 负责人: John Chatagnier
• 金额: $ 18.06万
• 依托单位: University of Houston
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-01-15 至 2023-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2048406&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; International; Coercion; Debt

National Science FoundationAbstractProposal: 2048406/2048416 PI Name: Shea, Patrick/Bunte, JonasProposal ID: 2048406/2048416Institution: University of Houston/University of Texas at DallasPrincipal Investigator: Patrick Shea/Jonas BunteNSF Program: Security and PreparednessTitle: Collaborative Research: International Coercion, Debt Relief, and Land TransactionsThis project will determine when governments transfer control over portions of their national territory to pay off loan debts to international creditors. The project will provide systematic evidence on the domestic and international conditions that influence the decisions of governments to exchange land for debt relief. The empirical analyses in the project will be based on a new dataset to be collected on all land transactions between countries related to debt relief. The results of this project will contribute to improving our understanding of when the international debt problems of countries can lead them to make territorial concessions to other countries. The project will develop and test theory on the different debt relief strategies that governments can choose to adopt and why land transactions are sometimes selected instead of other available policies such as austerity or default. A new and more comprehensive dataset on land transactions for debt relief will be collected for the period 2000 to 2020. Statistical analyses of the new data set, employing simultaneous equations, will be conducted to test theoretical propositions. The results of the project will advance basic research on the management of international debt, the use of economic leverage by states to gain concession from states on security issues, and the dynamics of international negotiations over territorial concessions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

国家科学基金会摘要提案：2048406/2048416 PI 姓名：Shea, Patrick/Bunte, Jonas 提案 ID：2048406/2048416 机构：休斯顿大学/德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校首席研究员：Patrick Shea/Jonas Bunte NSF 项目：安全与准备标题：协作研究：国际胁迫,债务减免和土地交易该项目将确定政府何时移交对其部分国家领土的控制权，以偿还国际债权人的贷款债务。该项目将为影响政府以土地换取债务减免的决策的国内和国际条件提供系统证据。该项目的实证分析将基于一个新的数据集，该数据集收集了与债务减免相关的国家之间的所有土地交易。该项目的结果将有助于提高我们对各国国际债务问题何时会导致其向其他国家做出领土让步的理解。 该项目将开发和测试有关政府可以选择采用的不同债务减免策略的理论，以及为什么有时选择土地交易而不是紧缩或违约等其他可用政策。将收集 2000 年至 2020 年期间关于债务减免土地交易的新的、更全面的数据集。将利用联立方程对新数据集进行统计分析，以检验理论命题。该项目的成果将推进国际债务管理、国家利用经济杠杆在安全问题上获得国家让步以及领土让步国际谈判动态等方面的基础研究。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并具有通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。